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A Path to American Dictatorship
The accumulation of all powers legislative, executive and judiciary
in the same hands, whether of one, a few or many, and whether
hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced
the very definition of tyranny. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, (J. Madi-
son).
I. INTRODUCTION
"[Allison Krause] was weeping . .. from emotion of what was
happening to her, her friends, and her campus. Troops with guns
and bayonets sweeping through an American University. To Alli-
son, this only happened in South America, and she was far from
alone in her reaction to what seemed like a military invasion."'
Pictures taken at the Kent State disorder and used as evi-
dence in the Davies Report showed Allison Krause alone and sil-
houetted against the sky. She was protesting the presence of the
troops on the campus.2 Other photographs showed that a platoon
of men huddled briefly and then formed a line.3 Testimony indi-
cated that a pistol shot was fired by one of the National Guardsmen
and the men pivoted to face the crowd of jeering students, raised
their rifles with some dropping to one knee, and fired at least sixty-
one shots into the crowd of students.4 Some evidence suggested
that the troops singled out as targets students who were obviously
dissenting. Sandy Lee Scheuer was killed while running from one
building to another to attend a class.5 Allison Krause was shot in
the back during a retreat. 6
The purpose of this Comment is to examine the potential conse-
quences of placing virtually unlimited power to use military forces
1. 117 CONG. REC. 26840, 26850 (1971) (Senator Moorhead introduces Kent
State Report into the Record) [hereinafter cited as DAVIES REPORT].
This is a quotation from the testimony of "Barry," the boyfriend of
Allison Krause, who witnessed her homicide during the Kent State
disorder.
2. Id. at 26843, 26848, 26850.
3. Id. at 26848-49.
4. Id. at 26843, 26844-45, col. 2 to col. 3, 26843, col. 2.
5. Id. at 26850, 26852.
6. Id, at 2684a.
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domestically in the hands of the executive. Section II will analyze
the distribution of this power among the legislative, executive and
judicial branches of government. Section III will examine poten-
tial abuses of the present distribution of power, suggest alterna-
tives, and describe a hypothetical result of the present concentra-
tion of power in the executive branch of the government.
II. THE ACCUMULATION OF POWER
Present legislative, executive and judicial standards relating to
the use of military troops in civil disorders are ineffective in limit-
ing the discretionary power of the chief executive. Legislation dele-
gating power to the chief executive fails to limit his power suffi-
ciently to comport with the language and intent of the Constitu-
tion. Further expansion of that delegated power by the executive
branch in the face of weak, inconsistent and ambiguous judicial
standards has resulted in no effective restraints on the chief execu-
tive. The most recent United States Supreme Court decision on
executive domestic military power, Scheuer v. Rhodes,7 has for the
first time allowed judicial review of the executive's decision
to deploy troops but it has not established guidelines to limit
the President's discretion.
A. Constitutional and Legislative Foundations
Use of military force to combat domestic violence and insurrec-
tion can best be analyzed by reviewing and comparing the consti-
tutional language and the intent of those drafting the Constitution
with existing legislation.
1. Constitutional Provisions
The Constitution does not grant the President the power to use
military force to suppress insurrections or to execute laws. A con-
troversial issue at the time the Constitution was drafted was
whether the federal government should be involved in this area
at all, since each colony had traditionally settled civil disturbances
with its own militia. The concept of a federal standing army used
to settle riots was repulsive, but a strong source of power was nec-
essary for an effective federal government. Sufficient power was
surrendered to the federal government, but all expressions and im-
plications placed the power in the hands of Congress, whose mem-
bers were directly responsible to local interests, and consisted only
of the power to use local militia called into federal service. Even
this created much controversy during the ratification of the Con-
stitution. As a result, article II of the Constitution does not give
7. 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
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the President the express power as chief executive or as comman-
der-in-chief to use military force in executing laws or 'suppressing
domestic insurrections. Only Congress, under article I, section 8 of
the Constitution, has the power to authorize federal use of the
state militia in situations involving domestic violence, and even
then the power is subject to state governmental control. The com-
mon law history behind the constitutional language illustrates that
the omission of domestic military power from the presidential pow-
ers of article II was an intentional limitation on executive power.
The only constitutional provision authorizing the use of military
force to protect against invasion and domestic violence is found in
article I, section 8. Thus, the only force provided by the Constitu-
tion for suppression of an insurrection or domestic violence is the
"militia."
a. Constitutional Language
A functional distinction between the "militia" as opposed to
the "army" and "navy" is drawn in article I, section 8. It provides
Congress with the power to establish laws and procedures for rais-
ing and calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the union,
to suppress insurrections of persons within the union, or to repel
invasions of foreign armies. Section 8 also authorizes Congress to
provide laws for organizing, arming and disciplining the military
and to provide for calling the militia into the service of the United
States, as well as raising an army and navy, but not for the purpose
of suppressing insurrections or executing laws. Thus, article I dis-
tinguishes "armies" and a "navy" as functionally distinct from a
"militia" by specifying that only the local milita may be deployed
domestically by concurrent federal and state power. Such federal
power was not reserved to the federal government regarding the
domestic use of the "army" and "navy." Consequently, the unre-
served use of the "army" or "navy" would be beyond the scope
of federal power under the tenth amendment as an interference
with state police power.
Article IV, section 4 of the Constitution guarantees every state
in the union "a republican form of government" and requires
that they be protected against invasion and "on application of the
Legislature or of the executive" (when the legislature cannot be
convened) against domestic violence."s
The modern "militia" reserved to the states has been held in
Maryland v. United States9 to be the National Guard units as pro-
8. U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 4.
'9. 381 U.S. 41 (1965). Definitions of the term 'nilitia" vary. When used
in statutory provisions, militia has been defined as "the class of state
citizens who are subject to military duty." Id. at 47.
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vided in the National Defense Act.10 The governor retains com-
mand of each unit unless they are called into active federal serv-
ice.' 2 The National Guard, though trained, equipped, structured
and funded by the federal government, is subject to state control
as a state militia.' 3 The National Guard is currently distinguish-
able from regular troops on this basis. The constitutional language
thus indicates that only the National Guard, and not regular
troops, can be used to suppress insurrection. The Constitution also
places the power for calling forth the militia primarily in the legis-
lature, giving the executive this authority only when the legislature
cannot be convened.' 4
b. Constitutional Intent and Common Law History
The constitutional language regulating the use of the military
was not accidental or unintentional. The drafters were attempting
to preserve local control of all law enforcement. In early English
common law, a standing force of citizen soldiers was created to
supplement the feudal army. This military unit, the forerunner
of the National Guard, was called the jurata ad arma.15 By the
mid-fourteenth century, the Court of Constables and Marshalls was
established with exclusive jurisdiction over the discipline of Brit-
ish armed-forces, both civilian and the regular armies, whenever
they were led off to war.' 6 When the jurata ad arma was used
for domestic purposes, it was considered to be an extension of the
sheriff and subject to the control of ordinary courts.'7 During the
fifteenth century Law of the Star Chamber, miltary force in the
Court of Constables and Marshalls was used effectively to abro-
gate due process rights.' s As a result of the Law of Star Cham-
10. 32 U.S.C. § 104 (1970), which provided for the equipping and training
of such units similar to the equipping and training of regular Army
troops. The federal government funds these units, 32 U.S.C. §§ 106-
08 (1970); see also discussion accompanying note 53 infra.
11. Maryland v. United States, 381 U.S. 41, 47 (1965). See 32 U.S.C. § 314
(1970).
12. 32 U.S.C § 317 (1970).
13. See 32 U.S.C. § 104 (1970). The National Guard is indirectly con-
trolled by the executive branch of the federal government because
failure to comply with federal directives will usually result in with-
drawal of federal funds. See REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADvisoRY COM-
MISSION ON Civ DisoRDERs 497 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Crivy
DlsoRDERs]; see also discussion accompanying note 219 infra.
14. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
15. Engdahl, Soldiers, Riots and Revolution: The Law and History of Mil-
itary Troops in Civil Disorder, 57 IowA L. REv. 1, 2-5 (1971); Note,
75 W. VA. L. REv. 143, 150 (1972).
16. See Engdahl, note 15 supra at 2-5; Note, supra note 15 at 151.
17. Id.
18. F. MAITLM-D, THE CONSTTUTONAL HISTORY OF ENGLANqD 260-70 (1908);
accord, Note, supra note 15.
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ber's actions, the restoration government declared the jurata ad
arma, which had become known as the posse comitatus,19 to be dis-
tinct from the militia which could be used only in time of actual
war, insurrection, rebellion, or invasion. The posse comitatus was
to be used to quell domestic disturbances, but only in accordance
with due process of law.20  Use of the military was reserved for
actual warfare. Although historically the "militia" and the "posse"
were the same, the militia was eventually viewed as the national
army and separate from the civilian force or posse.21
The Riot Act of 1714 allowed use of the posse to assist regular
local law enforcement officers such as the mayor and the sheriff
in suppressing riots.22 The posse, when used in this manner, re-
mained subject to civilian due process standards and was under
the control of local civilian authorities. These concepts of English
common law were ignored in the American colonies,23 and abuse
-of the principles underlying the posse comitatus was one of the fac-
tors leading to the American Revolution. The Declaration of Inde-
pendence stated that the people of the several colonies declared that
one of the grievances "impelling" them "to dissolve the politi-
cal bond" connecting them to the British nation and justifying
their withdrawal of allegiance from the British sovereign was that
"[the king] had affected to render the military independant of
and superior to civil power. ' 24
The Constitution was founded upon the principles of govern-
ment set forth in the Declaration of Independance. 25  During
the ratification debates the populace had to be assured that the in-
tended use of military force provided for in the Constitution was a
domestic force similar to the posse comitatus; that is, that only the
state militia would be used in instances of civil disorder, and that
it would always be subordinate to civil government.26 They feared
19. See Engdahl, supra note 15 at 16 n.2; Note, supra note 15 at 151.
20. See Note, supra note 15 at 151.
21. See Note, supra note 15 at 151 n.48. Compare Valdes v. Black, 446
F.2d 1071 (10th Cir. 1971) and discussion accompanying note 191 infra.
22. See Note, supra note 15 at 151.
23. One example of the misuse of the principle of the posse comitatus was
the use of troops in the Boston Massacre where the soldiers were not
subject to civilian law and authority. Engdahl, A Comprehensive
Study of the Use of Military Troops in Civil Disorders with Proposalsfor Legislative Reform, 43 U. COLo. L. REv. 399, 400 n.9 (1972) [here-
inafter cited as Comprehensive Study].
24. Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 152 (No. 9847) (C.C.D. Md. 1862).
25. Id.
26. THE FEDERALIST No. 8 at 44; No. 25 at 158; No. 26 at 164; No. 27 at
171; No. 29 at 181; No. 43 at 288 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton,
J. Madison). Shay's Rebellion in January, 1787, illustrated the need
for a force to deal with domestic disturbances. The Constitution gave
Congress the power to establish laws for providing an army and a mil-
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that by substituting federally controlled military power for a lo-
cally controlled force would subject them to martial law. Ever
since the constitutional period, the definition of martial law has
been the implementation of military power over civilians so civil-
ians are subjected to military control.2 7 Because armies are organ-
ized in a chain of command, when martial law is imposed, civilians
are governed by a single military commander within the particular
district. 28
When a citizen is governed by military power, he is not gov-
erned by the soldier's code of military law but is said to be gov-
erned by martial law. This law is perfectly distinct and entirely
different from the military law to which the soldiers are subjected.
When the military commander, as the agent of the king, president
or governor, governs the citizens, he does not rule them by the
code of military law enacted for soldiers but he governs the citizens
by arbitrary wiU. 2 9
Martial law is the arbitrary law of the military ruler for govern-
ing citizens in a time of necessity; it is the law of force and war
that depends upon the values of justice and power of the command-
ing leader. Though he does not make any laws by common consent
of the legislature in time of exigency and its consequent necessity
for restoring order, he has absolute power which makes his orders
as enforcible as statutory law.8 0
Martial law is more than the mere presence of the Army. It is
the supplantation of local civilian law and authority by the arbi-
trary discretion of a military commander possessing the potential
for absolute destruction of all civil rights.8 1
This potential risk of martial law is the recognized danger that
the drafters of the Constitution were attempting to avoid. Not
itia, and when the first Congress met, one of their initial acts was to
provide the means for protecting against civil disorders.
27. See Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1943); Sterling v. Constan-
tin, 287 U.S. 378 (1932); U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FAMPHLET No. 27-
11, MILITARY ASSrSTANCE TO CIVIL AuTHORITIEs 6-8 (1966) [hereinafter
cited as DoA PAMPHLET 27-11].
28. Franks v. Smith, 142 Ky. 232, 134 S.W. 484 (1911). Ex parte Lavinder,
88 W. Va. 713, 108 S.E. 428 (1921).
29. Griffin v. Wilcox, 21 Ind. 370, 478 (1863).
30. Id. at 477.
31. Wilson & Co. v. Freeman, 179 F. Supp. 520 (D. Minn. 1959). The army
objects to the contemporary use of the term "martial law" and favors
the term "martial rule" on the basis that "martial law" is not law at
all but rather supplantation of law with military force. "Martial rule"
is defined as the temporary government of the population through the
military forces as necessity may require. See Lectures on Martial
Law prepared by the Judge Advocate General's School, Charlottes-
ville, Virginia, 6 (1956). The effect is the same whichever term is
adopted-a civilian government supported by a military force. Mili-
tary law is distinguishable from all of these terms in that it governs
acts of the military only while they are engaged in military service;
W. BLACKSTONE, CommzTARIEs, 441-44.
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only does the literal language of the Constitution suggest a dis-
tinction between using federal troops for war and state militias
for domestic turmoil, but the common law history, the political
controversies fueling the American Revolution, and the adoption of
the United States Constitution also suggest that the founding fath-
ers intended to limit the use of military force domestically to the
use of a group of "civilian soldiers" acting as a locally controlled
posse comitatus. From these historical foundations it can be con-
cluded that the National Guard is to serve as the agent of local au-
thorities in enforcing civilian laws. The guarantee clause, in article
IV of the Constitution implies an obligation on the part of the
federal government to provide for and deploy National Guardsmen,
but not to remain in command or to use these troops domestically
as a military force subject to military law or Pentagon control.32
It is very important to note that the Constitution does not grant,
and the drafters did not intend it to grant, the power to suppress
insurrections or execute laws through use of the militia to any one
person. The power was expressly placed in the hands of Congress,
and even then there was significant controversy during the rati-
fication of the Constitution over whether the federal government
should interfere in this area at all.3 3
32. See Comprehensive Study, supra note 23 at 406. Some have asserted
that the guarantee clause removed the right of' the states to declare
martial law and placed it with the federal government in the instance
of domestic violence. Fairman, The Law of Martial Rule and the Na-
tional Emergency, 55 HARv. L. REv. 1253 (1942); see State ex Tel. Mays
v. Brown, 71 W. Va. 519, 77 S.E. 243 (1912).
33. Authors disagree about the amount of power that can be given to the
President by implication. See Furman, Restrictions Upon Use of the
Army Imposed by the Posse Comitatus Act, 7 MILITARY L. REV. 85
(1960) [hereinafter cited as Furman]; CoRwnv, THE PREiDENT: OFFic
AwD PowERs 1787-1957, 131 (4th ed. 1957) [hereinafter cited as CoR-
WIN]. Although it had always been assumed that "United States" in
the guarantee clause referred to Congress, as Chief Justice Taney
stated in Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 81 (1849), President
Hayes introduced the concept that the chief executive was included
in the term by furnishing arms and transferring troops without prior
congressional approval. See CoRwin at 134. The issue is not whether
the President can execute laws or command the military, but whether
he can at his discretion execute laws through use of military troops,
and whether he can direct military force against dissenting citizens
without congressional approval. Though many opinions cited herein
suggest that he has such implied power, fourteenth and fifteenth
clauses U.S. CoNsT. art. I § 8 in combination with art. IV § 4 and with
the intent at the time of its drafting, suggest that the President does
not have such authority. Instances cited herein will also demonstrate
some policy reasons for this interpretation. In Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952), the Court held that the
'President lacks the constitutional authority as commander in chief of
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2. Legislation
The present legislation regarding the domestic use of mili-
tary troops in civil disorders consists of chapter 15 of Title 10 of
the United States Code, the National Guard Army Act,3 4 and the
Posse Comitatus Act.3 5 This legislation creates a system far re-
moved from the concept of a locally controlled posse comitatus
consisting only of National Guard troops. Although the troops used
may be only National Guard troops called into active federal serv-
ice, the legislation does not require this. The troops are not
subject to local authority but rather to executive orders exclu-
sively. In fact, local control of troops is considered a federal crime
under the Posse Comitatus Act.
a. Chapter Fifteen
Chapter fifteen of Title 10 of the United States Code represents
a gradual erosion of the Posse Comitatus Doctrine through congres-
sional delegation of more and more of its constitutional power to
the executive. The effect has been to eliminate congressional au-
thorization, investigation and ratification of presidential use of
troops and to minimize congressional involvement in the use of mili-
tary power.
The first section of this chapter illustrates the erosion of con-
gressional involvement. Section 331 of Title 10 of the United States
Code ("section 331") is a remnant of a statute initially enacted
to limit the use of militia in civil disorders.36 The present version
of the statute eliminates any such limitation. Section 331 pro-
vides that in time of insurrection, the President is authorized to
call a state's militia into federal service to aid other states upon the
request of the state's legislature or its governor when the legisla-
ture cannot be convened. The state may request the number of
outside troops it wishes to employ, but the troops remain under the
control of the President to use as he considers necessary to sup-
press the insurrection. Up to the time of the Civil War, the
statute depicted the militia as a unique military unit to be used
only in instances of insurrection where all other efforts by local
sheriffs, police, and federal marshalls were ineffective. Local ef-
the armed forces to take possession of private property to stop a labor
dispute. The congressional policy was to be executed in a manner pre-
scribed by Congress, not the executive, and such law-making power
of Congress was not to be subjected to presidential and military super-
vision, Id. at 588. See discussion accompanying notes 56-64 infra.
34. 10 U.S.C. § 3500 (1970).
35. 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (1970).
36. The 1807 amendment to the statute replaced all reference to militia
to include the use of the regular standing Army. Act of March 3, 1807,
ch. 39, 2 Stat. 443.
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forts had to include the use of the posse comitatus or civilian
soldiers to support law enforcement officers and aid in the execu-
tion of state or federal laws.3 7
Section 332 of Title 10 of the United States Code ("section 332")
continued the expansion of presidential power by amending the test
for using troops from use in a situation of necessity to use of troops
in a situation where such use would be practical. Section 332,
which was derived from the consolidation of separate provisions
within earlier enactments of section 331,38 was adopted to allow the
President to use the state militia and federal troops for federal law
enforcement.39 Congress authorized the President to use military
force to execute federal laws whenever he considers that the lawful
obstruction of such laws makes it impractical to enforce the laws
through ordinary judicial proceedings. The President, under sec-
tion 332, is the absolute judge of what is necessary to enforce federal
laws or to suppress a rebellion.40  Section 332 significantly altered
the Posse Comitatus Doctrine because it eliminated the concept that
the use of troops as a military force was limited to situations where
civilian measures, including the use of troops as civilians in the na-
ture of a marshall's posse, have failed to control the exigency.
The new legislation authorized the President to resort to mili-
tary force without first relying on the civilian effort whenever he
considered reliance upon civilian measures to be impractical. New
language which has never been subjected to judicial scrutiny sur-
vives in 10 U.S.C. 332. 41
37. Act of May 2, 1792, ch. 28 § 2, 1 Stat. 264; Act of February 28, 1795,
ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 424; accord, Comprehensive Study, supra note 23
at 406.
38. See Act of July 29, 1861, ch. 25, 12 Stat. 281. Accord, Comprehensiie
Study, supra note 23 at 408 n.50.
39. Comprehensive Study, supra at note 23 at 408-09.
40. Whenever the President considers that unlawful obstruction, combina-
tions, or assemblages, or rebellion against the authority of the United
States make it impractical to enforce judicial proceedings, he may call
into federal service such of militia of any state and use the armed
forces as he considers necessary to enforce those laws or to suppress
the rebellion.
41. Comprehensive Study, supra note 23 at 409. See discussion accom-
panying note 48 infra of Jackson v. Kuhn, 254 F.2d 555 (8th Cir. 1958).
The case of In re Boyle, 6 Idaho 609, 57 P. 706 (1899), attempted to
amend the rule that martial law could not be declared while civil
courts were open, as held in Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2(1866). The Idaho Supreme Court narrowed this limitation by adding
that the courts must not only be open but also that their jurisdiction
be unobstructed. Concerning the Pullman Strike, see note 52 infra.
McElroy quoted Governor Altgeld's protest:
[iT]he conditions do not exist here which bring the cause
within the ,Federal statutes, a statute that was passed in 1881
and was in reality a war measure. This statute authorized
the use of federal troops in a state whenever it shall be im-
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Congress delegated to the President the authority to use military
force and the arbitrary discretion to enforce laws not only in situa-
tions of necessity but also in situations where such use is merely
practical.
Total presidential discretion and the non-involvement of Con-
gress in domestic military power was broadened even further in
section 333 of Title 10 of the United States Code ("section 333").
This section was the result of the Civil War and the post-Civil War
activities of the Klu Klux Klan. The Civil War accustomed the
nation to seeing soldiers acting the part of soldiers of war, not ci-
vilians, on home soil. The passions of the conflict and the determi-
nation of the victors to compliment at all costs the social mandate
of the victory, lead to the use of a solely federal military force,
even after the war ended, to achieve government objectives for
which the civilian process was too inefficient, too slow, or too ob-
stinate.42 This section, a remnant of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871,
provides that the President may use the militia, the armed forces,
or both to suppress an insurrection within a state which so hinders
the execution of the laws of that state or the United States that it
(1) deprives the people within the state of rights, privileges, or
immunities or protection or (2) opposes or obstructs the execution
of laws of the United States or impedes the course of justice under
these laws.43 Section 333 was enacted to enlarge the domestic
circumstances in which the President could employ a solely mili-
tary force. Under this section, the President may use the militia
or regular federal troops without a request from the state govern-
ment.44 He may use the troops to enforce both state and federal
laws and may call the troops as commander in chief even though
sufficient federal civilian forces might have been able effectively to
practical to enforce the law of the U.S. within such state by
the ordinary judicial proceedings. Such a condition does not
exist in Illinois. There have been a few local disturbances,
but nothing that seriously interfered with the administration
of justice or that could not be easily controlled by the local
or state authorities, for the federal troops can do nothing that
the state troops cannot do.
R. McELRoY, GROVER CLEVELAND THE MAN AND THE STATESMAN, Vol. 2,
154 (1923) [hereinafter cited as McELRoY]. Cleveland was merely ad-
hering to a practice frequently used by his predecessor, President
Hayes, in breaking the many strikes that occurred during the Hayes
administration. He repeatedly furnished the state authorities with
arms from the national arsenals and federal troops upon informal re-
quests from governors without ascertaining whether legislatures were
in session. S. Doc. No. 263, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. 175 (1922).
42. Comprehensive Study, supra note 23, at 408.
43. 10 U.S.C. § 333 (1970).
44. Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 3, 17 Stat. 14. Comprehensive Study,
supra note 23, at 409.
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control the disorder.45 This section embodies the greatest expan-
sion of executive military discretion because it eliminates any need
for state action as a condition of presidential action.
Section 334 of Title 10 of the United States Code ("section 334")
is the last section of chapter fifteen and was intended to limit
presidential discretion. But poor drafting has prevented this re-
sult. Section 334 requires the President to issue a proclamation
whenever he believes it necessary to use military force under
chapter fifteen. The proclamation shall "order the insurgents to
disperse and retire peaceably to their abodes within a limited
time,"' 4 6 but no sanction is provided if the President disregards this
statutory requirement. 47 The language of section 334 is an inade-
quate limit on the President even if a means of enforcement were
provided because the President is only required to issue a procla-
mation if he uses sections 331, 332, or 333 to justify the deployment
of troops. Any legislative authorization of presidential exercise of
military discretion outside chapter fifteen does not require a presi-
dential proclamation.
Although the constitutionality of chapter fifteen has never been
tested,48 the Supreme Court has held the President to be the sole
judge of the necessity for calling the military into federal serv-
ice;49 and his decision concerning which of two opposing state mili-
tia to support cannot be questioned by the courts.50 It has been as-
serted that the President has the power under the Constitution
and laws of the United States to call the National Guard into fed-
eral service and to use those forces together with such of the armed
forces as he deems necessary to suppress domestic violence, ob-
struction of federal law, and resistance to federal court orders. 1
The present view omits any concept of a posse comitatus, the use of
only National Guardsmen, the retention of legislative control or
45. Comprehensive Study, supra note 23, at 409-10.
46. 10 U.S.C. § 334 (1970).
47. See discussion accompanying note 255 infra for same suggested reme-
dies of the statute.
48. In Jackson v. Kuhn, 254 F.2d 555 (8th Cir. 1958), the court was faced
with the issue of whether the three statutes of chapter fifteen were
constitutional but never answered the issue because the appellants
lacked jurisdiction and the actions were dismissed. Id. at 560. The
court thus affirmed the district court holding that there was no sub-
stantial federal question in challenging the constitutionality of the
statutes. Id. at 558.
49. Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19 (1827).
50. Luther v. Borden, 12 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1848); see also, Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974), where the Supreme Court modified this
view by stating that the executive's discretion was judicially review-
able.
51. 41 Op. AT'VY Gsa. 313 (1957).
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input into the deployment process as provided in the Constitution. 2
b. The Army National Guard Act
The Army National Guard Act authorizes presidential discretion
in the domestic use of National Guardsmen without a proclama-
tion53 because the statute is outside chapter fifteen. Section 3500 of
Title 10 of the United States Code allows the President to call
members of the state Army National Guard units into federal serv-
ice for the purpose of repelling invasion, suppressing rebellion or
executing laws. These orders are issued through state and terri-
torial governors. Congress has codified the constitutional provision
52. These provisions have not prevented the President from acting without
the request of the state governor. President Cleveland dispatched
troops in the Pullman strike of 1894 over the protest of Governor Alt-
geld of Illinois who claimed he was capable of keeping order within
the state. H.R. Doc. 9, 54th Cong., 2nd Sess., Part II, 60 (1894). See
McELRoY, supra note 41 at 151-63. Cleveland's action was approved
in In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895), in the dictum of Justice Brewer
when he stated: "The entire strength of the nation may be used to
enforce in any part of the land the full and free exercise of all national
powers and the security of all rights entrusted by the Constitution to
its care." Id. at 582. See discussion accompanying note 41 supra. In
the North American Aviation strike in California of June 5, 1941,
President Roosevelt, without a request from the governor or legisla-
ture, deployed federal troops to operate the plant, citing his power as
commander in chief to justify the deployment; Washington Post,
June 10, 1941, at 3.
53. 10 U.S.C. § 3500 (1970).
Whenever-(1) the United States, or any of the Territories, Com-
monwealths, or possessions, is invaded or is in danger of
invasion by a foreign nation;(2) there is a rebellion or danger of a rebellion against
the authority of the Government of the United States; or(3) the President is unable with the regular forces to
execute the laws of the United States;
the President may call into federal service members and units
of the Army National Guard of any state or territory, Puerto
Rico, the Canal Zone, or the District of Columbia in such num-bers as he considers necessary to repel the invasion, suppress
the rebellion, or execute those laws. Orders for these pur-
poses shall be issued through the governors of the States, the
Territories, Puerto Rico, and the Canal Zone, and in the Dis-
trict of Columbia, through the commanding general of the Na-
tional Guard of the District of Columbia.See also 10 U.S.C. § 673 (1970), which provides for calling the National
Guard into federal service in either a declared national emergency or
"when otherwise authorized by laws" either existing or enacted in the
future; Linsalata v. Clifford, 290 F. Supp. 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Gold-
stein v. Clifford, 290 F. Supp. 275 (D.N.J. 1968). 10 U.S.C. § 3500(1970), is another existing law which authorizes federal use of Na-
tional Guard troops whenever there is danger of rebellion or when-
ever the President is unable to execute the laws with "regular forces."
See discussion accompanying notes 43 & 152 supra.
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authorizing it to provide for a militia to be used domestically 4 and
has delegated this power, in its entirety, to the President. The gov-
ernors of states or territories do not limit presidential actions, but
rather become a conduit for presidential power. If they were to
refuse to execute the orders, the President could issue a proclama-
tion under section 332 to the governor declaring him to be a dissi-
dent conspiring with the perpetrators of the exigency to obstruct
the execution of the laws.5 5 Thus National Guard troops are avail-
able to the President to execute any law without a proclamation,
and any attempt by state officials to obstruct such an execution
would justify a proclamation and use of National Guardsmen and
federal troops against the state government.
These provisions within Title 10 of the United States Code have
the effect of placing all domestic military power in the hands of
the President to the exclusion of all other branches of government.
Under these provisions, the President can use troops whenever they
can restore order. By authorizing the use of federal as well as state
troops, the concept of a civilian force acting in a military capacity
to restore order is also undermined. The intent of the Constitu-
tion to safeguard against the rule of a military commander with
the power to deploy a large standing army no longer exists be-
cause state control of the law enforcement can be set aside by the
commander in chief acting under chapter fifteen without legislative
involvement.
c. The Posse Comitatus Act
The concept of a local civilian force to control insurrection was
totally misunderstood by the 1870s. As a result, the initial consti-
tutional safeguards against martial law were further distorted by
the adoption of the Posse Comitatus Act.56 This act makes the will-
ful use of the Army or Air Force as a posse comitatus a criminal of-
fense punishable by fine or imprisonment or both except as ex-
pressly provided by the Constitution or an act of Congress.5" The
"acts of Congress" exception makes the sections regarding the use
of troops in chapter fifteen of Title 10 (sections 331, 332, and 333)
applicable to federal troops, but these sections do not "expressly"
authorize local civilian use of the federal army or air force as a
posse comitatus, subject to local civilian control.58  Neither does
54. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
55. See discussion, notes 41 & 52 supra.
56. 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (1970).
57. Id.
58. See discussion accompanying notes 15-21 supra. Other provisions fre-
quently regarded as exceptions to the Posse Comitatus Act, though
containing no express authorization for the use of troops, included 42
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the Constitution "expressly" authorize such use of troops as a posse
comitatus.
Thus, the statute completely outlaws the use of army or air
force troops as a posse comitatus. The statutory use of federal
troops under chapter fifteen, therefore, must always be subject to
the control of the federal military or the Department of the De-
fense. The control of the populace by military rule is the defini-
tion of martial law which the Constitution sought to avoid,59
thus the Posse Comitatus Act should be interpreted to mean that
the presidential use of federal Army troops under chapter fifteen
must include civilian control by the local government. Because the
Posse Comitatus Act refers only to the Army and Air Force, there
is an opportunity to circumvent further the Act's intent by using
the Navy or Marines. 60
The Posse Comitatus Act resulted from abuse of the posse by
federal marshalls during the fifteen years following the Civil War.
They used the federal troops to intimidate many areas of the South
during the Reconstruction Era of the 1870s, particularly during the
1876 national election. The troops were used under the guise of a
posse by the marshalls to perform various unlawful and unconstitu-
tional acts.01 The Reconstruction Era abuse of the posse was fur-
U.S.C. § 1855 (1970) regarding natural disasters. This section was re-
cently repealed. See 18 U.S.C. § 1855 (Supp. 1975). Other provisions
of lesser consequence allow the President to use military force at his
discretion to remove unauthorized persons from land belonging by
treaty to Indian reservations, 25 U.S.C. § 593(1), (5) (1970), 43 U.S.C.
§ 1065 (1970), 16 U.S.C. § 78 (1970), 16 U.S.C. § 23 (1970); to prevent
offenses against neutrality, 22 U.S.C. § 461-62 (1970), 50 U.S.C. § 194
(1970), 22 U.S.C. § 408 (1970); to execute quarantine and health laws,
42 U.S.C. § 268 (Supp. 1975); to enforce United States customs laws,
50 U.S.C. § 220 (1970); and to protect the rights of the discoverer of
Guano Island, 48 U.S.C. § 1418 (1970).
59. See, discussion accompanying note 27 supra.
60. Indeed the issue of whether a President may order the Marines to dis-
perse civil disorders without an executive order under chapter fifteen
and whether a local Marine commander may deploy troops for such
purposes without congressional or executive directives arises periodic-
ally. "[I] t is not clear whether the President approved the use of Ma-
rine Corps personnel to assist municipal officials in suppressing a snip-
ing incident in New Orleans in 1973 since no proclamation was issued."
N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1973, at 22, cols. 2-3. A requirement that the Pres-
ident formally notify the public whenever he used troops in a law en-
forcement role would have eliminated any doubt whether the action
was taken with the approval of the President or simply on the initia-
tive of local military commanders, whether state officials had asked
for help or whether the President was bypassing them, whether the
Marines have become a national policy reserve force, or whether this
was an isolated incident. Accord, 83 YALE L.J. 130, 148, 149 n.135
(1974).
61. See Comprehensive Study, supra note 23 at 410-11; Furman, supra note
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ther complicated by the inability of Congress to comprehend ei-
ther the concept of a posse comitatus or that the proper remedy for
the situation was a re-emphasis of the posse as an entity subject to
local civilian control as opposed to control by federal officers or
federal marshalls. Congressional debate on the measure illustrated
a change in the understanding of the posse comitatus. Tradition-
ally, troops were to be used first as civilians and only secondarily as
a military unit. The evolving notion was to use civilian law en-
forcement first and then to use the Army or militia as a military
force.0 2 The concept of using the Army under civilian control had
been clouded and eventually lost.6 3
The use of troops after these measures involved a far broader
standard than the previous one of merely an imperilous assault on
the government of the locale, the state or nation. As Engdahl
states: "Military troops insubordinate to local civil law officers,
performing in obedience to military law and generals by fiat, sus-
pending civilian law and liberties had become common place in
controlling civil disorders." 64
3. Conclusion
The Constitution embraces the concept of a posse comitatus as
the only legitimate use of military force in a civil disorder. Pres-
ent legislation concerning the use of military troops in civil disor-
ders has deviated substantially from the intent of the Constitu-
tion's language.
33 at 93-96. The election of President Hayes was so close that it de-
pended upon one pro-Republican Supreme Court Justice. F. SPARKs,
NATIONAL DzvEroMmNTr, 1877-1885 THE AucAN NATION: A HISTORY
No. 23, 120, 134 (1907). Democrats were exasperated with the machi-
nations of the Republicans and Grant's use of troops. The Democratic
Congress sought to limit the President's discretionary power to use
military force by adopting the Posse Comitatus Act.
62. See, Comprehensive Study, supra 23, at 410-11.
63. Id. at 412.
64. Id. at 413. No one has ever been prosecuted for violating the statute.
See Furman, supra note 33 at 86. There have also been many in-
stances where marshals or other federal officials requested the use of
troops and were refused. See, e.g., 21 Op. ATr'Y GEx. 72 (1894); 17
Or. ATT'Y GEN. 71 (1881); 16 Op. ATV'Y GEN. 162 (1878); 18 U.S.C.
§ 1385 (Supp. 1970). In Hildebrandt v. State, 507 P.2d (Okla. 1973),
and Burns v. State, 473 S.W.2d 19 (Tex. Ct. App. 1971), the courts held
that the use of military intelligence in narcotics investigations does not
violate this act. See discussion accompanying note 77 infTa. Furman
discusses an instance related to him by a commanding officer where
a sergeant delivered a borrowed tank to local Texas law enforcement
officers who needed it to rescue a fatally wounded deputy. Because
no one but the sergeant could operate the vehicle, he felt required to
participate in the rescue operation. He was never criticised on record.
Furman, supra note 33 at 124 n.242.
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The effects of the broad delegation to the President of power
over the militia are three-fold: (1) It destroys the limitation nor-
mally provided by a system of checks and balances,6" (2) it de-
stroys any check within the federal system between state and na-
tional governments by failing to protect the posse comitatus against
federal military encroachment, and (3) it provides for the destruc-
tion of the civilian's rights by sacrificing them to the principle of
necessity 6 and martial law instead of protecting them through lo-
cal civil law enforcement. This statutory scheme is much broader
and power is much more concentrated than ever intended by the
drafters of the Constitution. The history up to that time indicated
that the citizenry desired control as well as participation in the
domestic use of military power. The present statutory scheme
conflicts with such a safeguard.
B. Executive Policy
The power delegated to the executive by the legislature has
been organized with great efficiency and intricate detail. This
efficiency, when coupled with the strength and technological so-
phistication of the military, has so expanded the executive's dele-
gated power that there is a potential for subjecting the United
States to the President's personal control quickly, easily and thor-
oughly.
Understanding these conclusions demands an understanding of
the role played by executive policy. Unlike legislative and judicial
directives which are addressed to all, executive orders are theoret-
ically directed to departments of the executive branch concerning
the implementation of legislative and judicial rulings and the
proper reaction to the problems that arise.67 In reality, they prob-
ably more directly effect the lives of most citizens than do either
statutes or court decisions because it is executive orders that im-
plement the legislation and decisions.68
Executive orders regarding domestic use of military troops di-
rect subordinates in charge of deployment by establishing goals to
be achieved and by defining the context for mobilization proce-
dures.69 Particular executive military orders do not limit the pres-
ident's discretion because he can nullify a prior order with an-
65. Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 149-50 (No. 9487) (C.C.D. Md.
1862).
66. See discussion accompanying note 219 infra.
67. Richardson v. Young, 122 Tenn. 471, 125 S.W. 664, 668 (1910); Lime
v. Bragg, 345 Mo. 1, 131 S.W.2d 583, 585 (1939); see also K. DAvis,
ADmmsmATrv LAw 36.02 (1972).
68. See, PARADE MAGAZINE, January 27, 1974, at 2 & 22,
39..32 CF.R. § 215 (1974),
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other order at any time. With this in mind, the potential power
to subject the United States to military control will be illustrated
by analyzing (1) executive policy concerning that branch's dele-
gated authority, (2) that policy's scope regarding contingent mili-
tary operations to be implemented as a result of executive interpre-
tation and (3) the effect of such operations on the American
people.
1. Executive Interpretation of Delegated Authority
Executive orders regarding domestic military deployment have
subtly undermined the weak statutory limitations placed on the
President. The effect has been the establishment of full-scale co-
herent plans for the use of troops in instances and under cir-
cumstances beyond the scope and intent of the legislative scheme
discussed above.1 0
The present executive policy is set forth in section 215 of Title
32 of the Code of Federal Regulations (hereinafter "section 215").
Its stated purpose is to. support local civil authorities and protect
life, federal property and federal functions during a civil disturb-
ance.7 1 A civil disturbance is defined as a group act of violence
and disorder "prejudicial to public law and order" within the fifty
states or territories72 or as those domestic conditions requiring the
use of federal armed forces pursuant to Chapter 15 of Title 10 of
the United States Code.7 3 The term "prejudicial" is an undefined
standard. It could encompass a public dissent with a minor breach
of the peace 74 as well as an actual armed and organized rebellion
against the local, state or federal government.7 5 The broad defini-
tion of civil disturbance and the undefined standard of "prejudice"
permit wide-ranging discretionary interpretation by the executive.
The goal of section 215 (to protect lives, federal property, and
federal functions) is ambiguous because it fails to indicate to subor-
dinates whether troops should be used in the same manner when
70. See notes 35-64 & accompanying text supra.
71. 32 C.F.R. § 215.1 (1974).
72. Id. § 215.3.
73. Id.
74. See, DAVIES REP ORTS, supra note 1 at 26843, where evidence indicated
that the Kent State deaths resulted from what began as a demonstra-
tion against the Cambodian Invasion. The ROTC building on campus
became the target of the demonstration and troops were deployed to
extinguish fires and prevent destruction within the building. The
troops were subsequently used to disband the demonstration. The
students were killed on the next day in a setting devoid of a threat
of violence to the National Guardsmen or to campus property.
75. This was the standard stipulated in Ex parte Milligan for determining
when an exigency necessitates the use of troops. See notes 178-80 in-fra,
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federal functions are to be protected as when property and lives are
at stake. A federal function is liberally defined as any function,
operation, or action "by any department, agency, or instrumental-
ity of the United States government by a federal employee or of-
ficer."7 The issue is whether military troops can be used, for ex-
ample, to remove an obstruction of the mail though no armed or-
ganized rebellion exists.17  The definitions are broad enough to be
applicable to almost any situation of public dissent. Even without
presidential involvement, subordinates in the executive depart-
ment and state governors are left with broad discretion concerning
the availability of federal military support.
Limitations of executive power, other than self-imposed limits,
are derived from congressional application and court interpretation
of relevant constitutional provisions. Statutes have notoriously
neutralized constitutional constraints on the executive by delegat-
ing to the executive most congressional authority relating to the
control of military force. The few limits placed on the delegated
power because of the mere language of the statutes, have been un-
dermined by overgeneralized executive policy interpretations of
that legislation. Moreover, without congressional involvement and
support, the courts have been ineffective in limiting executive mil-
itary power.7 8
a. Executive Interpretation of the Constitution
The executive interpretation of the Constitution as set forth in
section 215 allows a broader use of military forces than constitu-
tional language would indicate. The justification found in section
215 for presidential deployment of troops domestically without spe-
cific statutory authority rests on three constitutional theories: (1)
the executive's right to preserve public order in, governmental op-
76. 32 C.F.R. § 215.3 (d) (1974).
77. This exact issue was contested in the Wounded Knee trials and the
government's right to use the military to remove obstruction of the
mall was upheld. United States v. Jaramillo, 380 F. Supp. 1375
(D.C. Neb. 1974). In this case, the military had loaned to federal offi-
cials weapons and the allegation was made that armored vehicles were
deployed. Testimony at the trial revealed that the Department of De-
fense directed the operations at Wounded Knee. Id. at 1377-78. The
defense motion to suppress the prosecution's evidence because it was
obtained through unlawful use of military troops without a proclama-
tion was denied. Judge Urbom held, however, that it was never
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that federal officials were acting
lawfully as required by 18 U.S.C. § 231(a) (3) (1970), the statute un-
der which charges were brought, because the prosecution failed to
show that the Posse Comitatus Act was not violated. Id. at 1379-82.
78. See McGonagle, Emergency Detention Acts: Peacetime Suspension of
Civil Rights-With a Postscript on the Recent Canadian Crisis, 20
CATH. U.L. REV. 203, 230 (1970) [hereinafter cited as McGonagle].
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erations by force, (2) the executive's "emergency authority," and
(3) the executive's authority to protect governmental property and
functions. None of the interpretations are the result of express
constitutional provisions, and to imply such authority conflicts
with the concept of safeguarding against martial law by maintain-
ing local and congressional involvement in the use of military
power domestically.
The Constitution does not expressly grant to the national gov-
ernment the right to preserve public order in governmental oper-
ations, especially through force.r 9 The implication to be drawn
from the constitutional language and the intent of the drafters is
that the militia, as the American posse comitatus, was the only
force provided by the Constitution to control domestic violence.30
Today, the militia is distinguishable from the regular Army as the
state-controlled National Guard.8 ' Thus, it is questionable
whether the Constitution provides the federal rather than the state
government the "inherent right to preserve public order in govern-
mental operations by force."82
Neither does the Constitution grant to the executive the "emer-
gency authority" to use military force to restore order, prevent loss
of life and protect property during civil disturbances or disasters.83
Section 215 does not refer to statutory or constitutional support
for the "emergency authority" to use military force in disasters
or calamities. The Constitution provides for use of the militia
(presently the National Guard) only in instances of invasion, in-
surrection, or unexecuted laws or domestic violence.8 4
Finally, section 215 cites "the Constitution" generally for the
authority to use military force to protect federal property and fed-
eral functions.8 5 Neither the broad definition of federal functions
in section 215, nor the right of the government to use military force
is explicit within the Constitution or statutes. The Constitution
authorizes the executive to "execute laws" but this does not neces-
79. 32 C.F.R. § 215.4(c) (1) (1974).
80. See discussion accompanying notes 8-32 supra.
81. See discussion accompanying notes 13-14 supra.
82. See discussion accompanying notes 218-47 infra concerning the inher-
ent rights of government and the scope of those rights.
83. 42 U.S.C. § 1855 provides for federal assistance to areas of the nation
incurring a "major disaster" as determined by the president. It pro-
vides for funding, supplies, personnel and general support and coordi-
nation by all federal agencies but it does not "expressly" authorize
the use of any army troops as required by the Posse Comitatus Act;
see discussion accompanying note 56 supra. National Guard troops are
available, however, without violating that statute and are usually used
under 10 U.S.C. § 3500.
84. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8.
85. 32 C.F.R. § 215.4(c) (1) (ii) (1974).
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sarily include protecting government property or government func-
tions with military troops in all instances. Government property
or operations could be obstructed without expressly violating a law.
Further, neither the Constitution nor the statutes allow the use of
military force to protect property or operations, even if they are
obstructed.86
These three constitutional interpretations are significant ex-
pansions not only of constitutional power but of legislative power
delegated to the executive by the Posse Comitatus Act.87 Con-
gress forbade anyone from using the Army or Air Force to execute
or enforce laws, unless expressly authorized by Congress or the
Constitution. 8 Since neither the Constitution nor legislation ex-
pressly authorizes the domestic use of military troops in catastro-
phies and disasters, to protect federal property or federal func-
tions, or under an "emergency authority," presidential use of mili-
tary power for these purposes would be a violation of the Posse
Comitatus Act. This act is only applicable to use of the federal Army
or Air Force so that using National Guardsmen, Navy or Marines
to perform any of these undelegated and undefined tasks would
not be unlawful.8 9 The previously discussed National Guard Act 90
may not be applicable in all cases because, again, the protection
of federal property and operations does not necessarily involve exe-
cuting laws or suppressing insurrections; but even so, the executive
use of only National Guard troops, though lacking congressional
86. U.S. CONST. art. rV, § 3, provides Congress with the power to make
rules and regulations to protect the property of the United States.
It neither gives any such power to the President nor specifically pro-
vides for the use of military troops. Chapter fifteen does not ex-
pressly provide for the use of troops to protect government property;
see discussion accompanying notes 36, 40, 43 supra. 32 C.F.R. § 215
(1974) did not cite any legislation to support the executive's right to
protect government property with military force but that executive
order did cite the United States Constitution generally.
87. 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (1970); see discussion accompanying notes 56-64. Con-
gressman Knott, the drafter of this Act, made it clear that he intended
the word "whoever" to include everyone "from the Commander-In-
Chief down to the lowest officer in the army who may presume to
take upon himself to decide when he shall use the military force in
violation of the law of the land." 7 CoNG. REc. 3847 (1878). Since
only Congress, not the President, has the constitutional authority to
provide for domestic military force, this interpretation would not vio-
late the President's constitutional authority. See discussion accom-
panying notes 31-33 supra. The sentiment of the Congress at the time
of adopting the Act was that the President's authority ought to be lim-
ited. See discussion accompanying note 61 supra. But see Furman, su-
pra note 33, at 98.
88. See discussion accompanying notes 56-64 supra.
89. Id.
90. 10 U.S.C. § 3500. See discussion accompanying notes 53 & 54,
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and constitutional authority, is not prohibited by statute.9 1 The
previously discussed proclamation in section 334 of chapter fifteen
of the United States Code is applicable only to those congressional
authorizations of executive power within chapter fifteen of Title
10.92 Thus, when using these three constitutional interpretations
to justify the use of troops, the President is not required to issue
any proclamation but can merely order the troops mobilized to the
emergency site and to assume control of local operations.
b. Executive Interpretation of Statutory Authority
The executive interpretation of power delegated by Congress
adopts the most discretionary view possible. This is evident in
sections 331 and 332 of chapter fifteen of Title 10 and in section
3056 of Title 18.
There are two ambiguities in section 331. First, section 331 pro-
vides for calling into federal service "the militia of the other states
... and use of such of the armed forces, as 'he considers necessary
to suppress the insurrection 93 within a particular state. Exec-
utive policy interprets "the militia of the other states" as an au-
thorization to call the militia of all states including the -disorderly
state's own militia.94 This interpretation in effect shifts control of
the local militia from the state governor to the Department of
Defense.9 5
The second ambiguity in section 331 is the provision authorizing
the President to call the militia and "use such of the armed forces
...." An interpretation coherent with the intent and history of
91. 10 U.S.C: § 3062 defines "Army" to include the Army National Guard
of the United States, the Army National Guard while in the service
of the United States and the Army Reserve. From this it would seem
that the term "Army" in the Posse Comitatus Act would also prohibit
unlawful use of Army National Guard. See Furman, supra note 33
at 99. The National Guard, when nationalized, becomes part of the
federal "Army." 10 U.S.C. § 3500 is an "expressly" authorized con-
gressional exception to the Posse Commitatus Act permitting the Presi-
dent to use National Guard troops to repel invasion, to suppress insur-
rection and to execute the laws. See discussion accompanying notes
53-54 supra. The Department of Defense removes the state-appointed
command structure and implements the Pentagon-appointed change
of command. 10 U.S.C. §§ 3542, 3495-501 (1970). This statute, though
a broad delegation of power, reflects the constitutional intent that a
local civilian militia should suppress civil disorders. It fails to reflect
the intent that the federal government or a single federal official
should not have broad discretion. See discussion accompanying notes
24-26 & 33 supra.
92. See discussion accompanying note 29 supra.
93. 10 U.S.C. § 331 (1970).
94. 32 C.F.R. § 215.4(c) (2) (i) (1974).
95. See discussion accompanying notes 116-28 infra.
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the Constitution and the statute is that the President may call the
National Guard and use these troops as he deems necessary. The
executive interpretation in section 215 adopts the unrestricted
view that section 331 allows the use of both the milita (or Na-
tional Guard) and armed forces (or regular troops) when a state is
unable to control domestic violence and federal assistance is re-
quested.96
Section 332 raises the same issue regarding use of only National
Guard troops versus the use of both National Guard troops and
the regular armed forces. Section 333 distinguishes the "militia"
from the "armed forces" and provides for use of both in an ex-
igency. This distinction is coherent with constitutional intent,
but the authorization to use the armed forces breaches any consti-
tutional safeguard against martial law.
The executive interpretation regarding section 332 is that both
National Guard and regular troops can be used as in section 331. A
second, and more significant, deviation in executive interpretation
of section 332 is that it establishes the standard for using troops
when government authority is so obstructed that it is "impractical
to enforce the laws of the United States ... by the ordinary course
of judicial proceedings. '97 If this is interpreted as establishing that
obstruction of the judicial process is the test for determining when
an emergency necessitates using troops, then the statute codifies
the holding in Ex parte Milligan.9" The statute was revised
shortly after the Milligan decision, indicating that this was prob-
ably the intent of Congress.99 Section 215 of the Code of Federal
Regulations provides a lower standard because it allows the use of
troops when the exigency cannot be controlled by local law en-
forcement officials, even though the courts are still open, local gov-
ernment is not threatened, and other state means of handling the
situation may not yet have been tried.100
Executive policy interprets section 3056 of Title 18 of the United
States Code as authorizing the use of military force to protect gov-
ernmental officers and major political candidates from physical
harm. A resolution stating that "federal departments and agen-
cies" are to assist the Secret Service in protective duties was passed
June 6, 1968.101 The resolution does not expressly authorize the use
96. 32 C.F.R. § 215.4(c) (2) (i) (a) (1974).
97. 10 U.S.C. § 332 (1970).
98. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 121-22 (1866).
99. See discussion accompanying note 44 supra.
100. 32 C.F.R. § 215.4(c) (2) (i) (b) (1974). This is very similar to the hold-
ing of the Idaho Supreme Court in In re Boyle, 6 Idaho 609, 57 P.
706 (1899); see discussion accompanying note 41 supra.
101. H.J. REs. 1292, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2 (1968), 82 Stat. 170. Executive
Order 32 C.F.R. § 215.4(c) (2) (i) (d) (1974) refers to this resolution
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of military troops to protect governmental officials and politicians,
and to imply that the term "federal departments and agencies" au-
thorizes the use of troops for this purpose violates the policy under-
lying the Posse Comitatus Act.10 2
The Constitution provides for military protection from invasion
and authorizes the use of the military to guarantee a republican
form of government to each state. These provisions do not ex-
pressly or implicitly include protecting rights of political candi-
dates. The initial intent of the joint resolution was to protect
government officials and political candidates through the use
of regular law enforcement agencies such as the Secret Service,
the Federal Bureau of Investigation and state and local authori-
ties.'0 3  When these means are no longer effective, troops may be
used, based, however, on a threat to law enforcement as a necessary
part of the republican form of government rather than on the
rationale of protecting individual politicians.10 4  Without express
congressional or constitutional authorization for the, domestic
use of troops, executive policy, if effectuated, would be a viola-
tion of the Posse Comitatus Act. As with the executive interpre-
tations of the Constitution, this criminal liability could be skirted
,by using National Guard troops called into federal service.'0 5 Be-
cause the joint resolution'0 6 is outside chapter fifteen, the President
would not be required to issue a proclamation to use troops.'
0 7
They could be mobilized and deployed without notice to anyone ex-
cept the commanding officer. Section 215, as a practical matter,
does not restrict the President in this situation. Even though mi-
nor linguistic restrictions are present in chapter fifteen, they are
ignored.
Perhaps the most significant aspect of this executive policy is
that a resolution supplementing a statute is interpreted as authoriz-
ing unlimited discretion in the use of military troops in a political
campaign. An actual exigency or a request by the political candi-
which was passed two days after Robert F. Kennedy, then a presi-
dential candidate, was shot.
102. 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (1970). See discussion accompanying notes 56-61 su-
pra.
103. See 114 CONG. REc. 16170 (1968) (remarks of Senator Javits on H.J.
REs. 1292, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2 (1968), 82 Stat. 170 where Congress
discussed the use of military troops to assist the Secret Service but
failed to express such intent within the language of the resolution).
But see Note, Honored in the Breech: Presidential Authority to Exe-
cute the Laws with Military Force, 83 YALE L.J. 130, 146 nn.114-15
(1973).
104. See discussion accompanying note 8 supra.
105. See discussion accompanying notes 89-90 supra.
106. See note 101 supra.
107. 32 C.F.R. § 215.4(c) (2) (i) (1974) notes that a proclamation is only
needed under chapter 15 of Title 10. See also 10 U.S.C. § 334 (1970).
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date for protection is not required. If this power were abused by
subjecting an area to military control during an opponent's cam-
paign, it could give the appearance that the candidate was a trou-
ble maker whose presence necessitated the use of troops. Troops
could thus be used to an incumbent's political advantage. 08 This
portion of section 215 allows the executive to use military force
without express congressional or constitutional authorization, with-
out a proclamation, without guidelines or limitations concerning
proper use, and without the consent of the individual in whose be-
half the military is intervening.
The executive policy regarding the Army National Guard Act
also assumes the broadest possible interpretation of the statute.
Section 3500 Title 10 of the United State Code allows the President
to call National Guard troops into federal service whenever he is
108. See Note, supra note 103 at 146 n.114 which stated:
Troops have been detailed to assist the Secret Service on
covert intelligence and law enforcement missions on a number
of occasions, eight of them involving significant numbers of
troops. In August 1968, 6000 regular troops were pre-posi-
tioned in Chicago under the direction of the Secret Service
during the Democratic National Convention, see PMGHTs in
CONFLICT 103, 116 (Bantam ed. 1968) (study report of the Na-
tional Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence).
However, only a fraction of these were actually used-on cov-
ert intelligence missions. See Hearings on Federal Data
Banks, Computers and the Bill of Rights, Before the Sub-
comm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 1293, 1751 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as Hearings].
Troops were used during each of President Nixon's inaugu-
rations under the direction of the Secret Service, see RIGHTS
I CoxcoRD 108 (G.P.O. 1969) (study report of the National
Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence);
ScHLoTmBEcK AND _ANsNNF supra note 63, at 8; N.Y.
Times, Jan. 18, 1973, at 35, col. 3.
Troops were used on three occasions to garrison the White
House during anti-war demonstrations: in November 1969,
May 1970, and May 1971, see, e.g., Wash. Post, May 3, 1971,
at 18, cols. 2 & 3; Demonstrations and Dissent in the Nation's
Capital (Dep't of Justice Press Release, June 8, 1970), in
Hearings, supra at 1384.
Troops were also used under the control of the Secret Serv-
ice during the 1972 Democratic and Republican National Con-
ventions. See N.Y. Times, July 9, 1972, at 1, col. 2; id., August
18, 1972, at 26, col. 6.
Troops were stationed under the control of the Secret Service dur-
ing both the Democratic and Republican National Conventions for the
purpose, according to the administration, of preventing another Chi-
cago riot as in 1968. See N.Y. Times, July 9, 1972, at 1, col. 2; Wash.
Post, August 18, 1972, at 26, col. 6. The presence of regiments of troops
usually increases the chances of a riot. See discussion infra at note
219. Such a riot would have further split the Democratic Party, just
as the Chicago riot split the Republican Party in 1968. See M. RoyKo,
Boss: RicHARm DALLY, 191-94 (1970). See also discussion infra at note
289 regarding the suspension of the 1972 election.
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unable to execute laws with "regular forces." Whether "regular
forces" refers to the ordinary administrative channels for executing
laws or to federal armed forces has never been defined by Congress
or the courts. 0 9 Executive policy as set forth in section 215 chooses
the former, a lower standard.
The conclusion to be drawn is that the President takes the
ambiguous language of the statutes delegating power and subtly
expands their purposes. In some instances, the interpretation is so
broad that it suggests usurpation of power. Restraints exist only
in the language and not in procedural or institutional safeguards.
2. Contingent Military Operations
The risk of abuse in using military troops domestically could
be substantial if a highly motivated but misguided executive were
ever to be President. Section 215 which provides the basis for
executive power in this area, provides a contingency plan for mar-
tial law including plans for troop deployment, control of the popu-
lace, and control of information passing between civilians and the
government." 51
These contingency procedures delegate to the Secretary of the
Army most of the authority given to the President by chapter fif-
teen."' Section 215 authorizes the Secretary of the Army and po-
litically appointed subordinates" 2 to call federal reserve units and
state National Guard units into active service." 3 The Secretary co-
ordinates the mobilization with all local civil and military authori-
ties and directs deployment of military resources through mili-
tary commanders.1 4 A civil disturbance need not be present to
deploy troops; it is sufficient that there is a potential for a dis-
turbance.15
109. Exec. Order No. 11519, 35 Fed. Reg. 5003 (1970). The inability to exe-
cute 39 U.S.C. § 707, 5102, 6001, 6101 (1958) regarding mail delivery
during a postal strike was interpreted as sufficient inability to exe-
cute laws with "regular forces" as to require National Guard units.
See discussion accompanying note 53 supra. But see Note, supra note
103 at nn. 109-73.
110. 32 C.F.R. § 215.5 to 215.10 (1974).
111. Id. § 215.6(c) (1974); see also 3 U.S.C. § 301 (1970), for presidential
power to delegate authority.
112. These "subordinates" include the Secretary of Navy and the Secretary
of the Air Force who would normally be equals to the Secretary of
the Army, but in domestic deployment under § 215 they are subordi-
nated to the Secretary of the Army who acts as coordinator. 32 C.F.R.
§ 215.6 (1974).
113. 32 C.F.R. §§ 215.6 (a) (3), (4), (5) (ii) (1974).
114. Id. § 215.6(a) (10) (1974).
115. Alabama v. United States, 373 U.S. 545 (1963).
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The contingency plans are consistent with the present military
policy known as the Army Doctrine." 6 Under the Army Doctrine,
the military would retain control of troops in the area subjected to
martial law and take command of the local government. Total or
partial control of troops by civil officials in the true historical
sense of a posse comitatus is usually avoided." 7 Although the mil-
itary has established military tribunals only in grave situations,
such as in the midst of actual warfare, this limitation is maintained
only in older cases such as Ex parte Milligan."3 Training pro-
cedures for establishing military tribunals are maintained" 9 but
will not, according to the Doctrine, be implemented unless civil
courts are closed.120 The military, however, may close the courts
as they did in 1941 when martial law was established in Hawaii
after the bombing of Pearl Harbor.' 2 ' The command control of the
troops remains with the federal government acting through the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.122 They are to utilize already established
plans of "specified and unified commands" to direct the mobiliza-
tion and use of troops for controlling the populace. 23 These pre-
pared reports exist in the Joint Reporting Structure and provide
coordination of command, control and communications. 24
The army has planning packets with plans for handling civil
disturbances occuring in many cities while still maintaining the
national defense posture. 25 When the military establishes control,
local authority is subordinated. The military enforces laws and
provides relief at the direction of the executive department, includ-
ing the Joint Chiefs of Staff, acting through the Directorate of the
Military Command, and the President. 26
By claiming the right to use the military in national disasters
and calamaties, the executive can utilize the contingency plans of
116. See DoA PAA/MPnIr 27-11.
117. Comment, Martial Law and the National Guard, 18 N.Y.L.F. 216, 229
(1972). In Hawaii after the bombing of Pearl Harbor, the entire ter-
ritorial government was turned over to the military and civil courts
were closed. Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1945). See dis-
cussion accompanying notes 186-90 infra.
118. DoA PAmPBLm 27-11; see Comment, supra note 117 at 229; Lectures
on Martial Law for the Judge Advocate General's School 23-27 [here-
after cited as J.A.G. Lectures].
119. See J.A.G. Lectures, supra note 118 at 23-27.
120. Id. at 17.
121. See J.A.G. Lectures, supra note 119 at 16-17; Duncan v. Kahanamoku,
327 U.S. 304, 308-09 (1945).
122. 32 C.F.R. §§ 215.6(a) (7), 215.6(6) (1), 215.7(a)(1) (1974).
123. Id. §§ 215.6 (a) (7), 215.7 (a) (1) (1974).
124. Id. § 215.6(a) (7) (1974).
125. Id. § 215.6 (a) (8) (1974); see also Civn. DisoRDEs, supra note 13 at
500-01.
126. 32 C.F.R. 215.5, 215.6 (1974).
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the Office of Emergency Preparedness.1 27 These plans provide for
control of elements within a geographic area.128 Deploying troops
means that the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their military subordinates
assume command over the locale, displacing state and local officials.
The planning information for controlling the populace is unavail-
able to the public. It is available, 'however, to the various com-
manders at the time troops are mobilized. 29 All information re-
leased to the public is controlled ,by the Assistant Secretary of De-
fense. In certain instances the military may even take control of
the news media in the area, particularly the broadcasting industry,
and disseminate the news.130
The military also controls and classifies information it obtains
during the disorder. The military follows specific procedures in the
collection and maintenance of intelligence data.' 31 This informa-
tion is usually the most complete and accurate account of the emer-
gency conditions available because it is usually obtained through
the only organized, controlled operation and channeled through a
centralized command center. 32
The executive branch has statutory authority to withhold this
information if it is deemed relevant to the national defense or is
part of investigatory files compiled for law enforcement pur-
poses.1 8  A citizen wishing to challenge presidential use of troops
after the violation of constitutional rights by the military must
overcome "executive privilege" or have available his own accurate
data concerning the events. A potential plaintiff must challenge
the privilege's applicability without an opportunity to evaluate the
evidence.'3 4, In effect this creates a presumption that the President
127. 32A C.F.R. DMO VII-7 to DMO 8555.1A (1974).
128. These include such things as maintaining law and order, distributing
food, and controlling transportation, utility and communication facili-
ties. 24 C.F.R. § 220 (1974).
129. 32 C.F.R. § 215.6 (a) (7) at n.3 (1974).
130. In Hawaii after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the military subjected the
radio and theatre industries to strict censorship regulations; see J.A.G.
Lectures, supra note 119 at 33.
131. 32 C.F.R. § 215.6 (a) (8) (1974); and 32 C.F.R. § 292 (1974).
132. See McGonagle, supra note 78 at 213-14. See also Crvm DIsoRDERs, su-
pra note 13 at 504-12.
133. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970).
134. Rule 509 (c) of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence provided a
privilege for secrets of state and other official information. In the case
of "secrets of state" (whichunder the proposed rules included a gov-
ernmental secret relating to the national defense), upon motion of the
government, the judge could permit the government to make an in
camera showing of a reasonable likelihood of danger. The version of
the Federal Rules recently enacted by Congress, Act of January 2,
1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926, eliminated specific privilege
rules and substituted the following:
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and his subordinates correctly perceived and reacted to the cir-
cumstances.135 Much of the available evidence consists of intan-
gibles such as the officials' experience, feelings and intuitions.136
There have been instances in which courts have been unable to re-
ject the executive's description of the emergency because of limited
public access to evidence which even when available tends to be
subjective.'8 7
Thus, section 215 not only provides the broadest executive dis-
cretion possible but also contains contingency plans directing the
coordination and control of troop deployment. The plans coordi-
nate military intelligence data and restrict public access to infor-
mation. Further, even in court, access to information is limited by
the doctrine of executive privilege. The combination of delegat-
ing military power to the executive, executive expansion of this
power and the coordinated use of the military threatens individual
rights.
3. The Effect of Military Control
The effect of military control on individiual rights depends upon
the fate of the Writ of Habeas Corpus and, ultimately, on the ability
of the populace to subdue the military in the event power is abused.
The "Great Writ" is vital because it provides an unlawfully de-
tained individual his only access to a court where he can effectively
assert his rights, demonstrate the unlawfulness of his detention, and
obtain redress of his injuries. Without access to the Writ of Habeas
Corpus, the populace could only rely on the military's self-restraint
to avoid oppression.
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the
United States or provided by Act of Congress or in rules pre-
scribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority,
the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or politi-
cal subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of
the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of
the United States in the light of reason and experience. How-
ever, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an ele-
ment of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the
rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person, govern-
ment, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be deter-
mined in accordance with State law.
For a detailed discussion of the executive privilege issue, see Separa-
tion of Powers and Executive Privileges: The Watergate Briefs, 88
PoL. Sci. Q. 582 (1973); see also United States v. Nixon, 94 S. Ct. 3090
(1974).
135. McGonagle, supra note 78 at 213.
136. Id.
137. In re Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. 81 (1943); Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214 (1944). But see Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214,
242 (1944) (Jackson, J. dissenting).
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The availability of the Writ may affect the tactics employed
by the military. Suspending the Writ of Habeas Corpus delays the
operation of its guarantees. Although the Writ may not be totally
abolished because it has been held to be permanently established
in the Constitution,1 38 during its suspension the military can detain
individuals without bringing them before a court for arraignment
and without affording them their due process rights such as bail,
and right to counsel.139 While it is clear that acting together, the
138. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 WaIl.) 2, 125-26 (1866); accord, McGon-
agle, supra note 78 at 226.
139. Under 50 U.S.C. §§ 811, 812(a) (3) (1950), repeated act of Sept. 25, 1971
Pub. L. No. 92-128, § 2 (a), 85 Stat. 348, the President had the power
to detain large numbers of people in non-war situations to maintain
internal peace under § 812(a) (3). He also had the power under the
Emergency Detention Act to create "concentration camps" to be used
in time of a presidentially declared "internal security emergency."
McGonagle, supra note 78 at 204 nn. 2-3. The legislation was largely
the result of the McCarthy era of the early 1950s and was a response
to the fear of communism. Id. at 207-09. In 1969, there were rumors
that the Nixon administration was readying concentration camps,
which had been constructed in the 1950s but were later abandoned,
for use against residents of ghettos and political dissidents, 1 T. EMER-
SON, D. HABER & N. DoRm, PoLrIcAL AND C=VI RiGHTS 3w THE UNITED
STATEs 186 (stud. ed. 1967); Concentration Camps in America? 60 Min-
utes, vol. 1, No. 18 (CBS Television Network, June 24, 1969). Accord,
McGonagle, supra note 78 at 207 n.9. See also discussion accompany-
ing note 280 infra. The House Committee on Un-American Activities
had been contemplating use of "guerilla warfare." After McGonagle's
article discussing the hazardous potential of such legislation by com-
paring it to recent instances of martial law in Canada and South Af-
rica, the statute was repealed in 1971 by Act of Sept. 1, 1971, Pub.
L. No. 92-128, § 2(a), 85 Stat. 348.
Repealing that statute has not eliminated the threat of detaining
political dissenters in concentration camps. Anyone can be imprisoned
up to one year who "enters, remains in, leaves or commits an act
in any military area or military zone prescribed under the authority
of an executive order of the president, by the Secretary of the Army,
or by the military commander. . . .", 18 U.S.C. § 1383 (1970). Under
this statute, President F.D. Roosevelt issued Exec. Order No. 9066, 7
Fed. Reg. 1407 (1942), ordering persons of German and Italian extrac-
tion to be excluded from certain areas and the mass exclusion and re-
location of persons of Japanese extraction into concentration camps on
the West Coast. All coastal states were declared to be military areas
and placed under the authority of military commanders. See 7 Fed.
Reg. 2320 (1942) (regulating the West Coast); 7 Fed. Reg. 3830 (1942)
(regulating the East Coast); 7 Fed. Reg. 6754 (1942) (regulating the
Gulf Coast). The Supreme Court upheld the convictions of Japanese-
Americans for violation of exclusion and curfew orders and their relo-
cation in concentration camps. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S.
81 (1943); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Yasui v.
United States, 320 U.S. 115 (1943). In Ex parte Mitsuye Endo, 323
U.S. 296 (1944), the Supreme Court ordered the release of a Japanese-
American held in a relocation center, on the basis that she could be
excluded from a certain area but could not be detained by the War
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President and Congress may suspend the Writ,140 it is unsettled
whether Congress acting alone may do so.14 1 Likewise, it is not
clear that the President, at a time when Congress is in session, may
unilaterally suspend the Writ.142  If Congress were not in session,
however, and there existed a dangerous situation necessitating,
in the President's judgment, suspension of the Writ the President
may constitutionally suspend the Writ in order to guarantee a re-
publican form of government. If Congress later ratifies the Presi-
dent's actions, the issue becomes moot.143  Even if the Writ were
not suspended and detained individuals invoked its protection,
the courts might be reluctant to act because of the politically sen-
sitive nature of the situation.1 4 4  A person detained can be re-
leased under the Writ of Habeas Corpus only after government ob-
jectives have been achieved, 45 and, therefore, only after his civil
liberties have been denied. The courts would be unable to act
quickly in this situation because the evidentary problem of execu-
tive privilege would again arise.146 The sheer number of detain-
ees could overwhelm the court, making court procedures totally in-
applicable or so prolonged that, in effect, a "suspension" has oc-
curred. 47  Finally, the court could be closed entirely by the mili-
tary.1 48 Thus, a citizen's rights can be lost either through delayed
court intervention or no court intervention at all.149
If the proper conditions existed for complete military control
Relocation Authority after her loyalty to the United States was con-
ceded. Thus, there remains a court-tested, statutory authorization for
executive detention of citizens in concentration camps for the purpose
of preserving national security or, more specifically, on suspicion of
sabotage and espionage, though no such incident has occurred.
140. Id.
141. J. RANDALL, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN 135-36 (rev.
ed. 1951). See also CoRwIN, supra note 33 at 146 and U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 9 fi 2. Accord, McConagle supra note 78 at 226.
142. Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (No. 9487) (C.C.D. Md. 1861) which
held that the President could not suspend the Writ of Habeas Corpus
was only a circuit court opinion. Congress delegated power to Presi-
dent Lincoln to suspend the Writ before the case could be appealed
to the Supreme Court. Thus, this issue was never completely settled.
McGonagle, supra note 78 at 226. The Merrymanm opinion by Chief
Justice Taney has been interpreted as a non-definitive answer on the
issue. 10 Op. ATT'Y GEN. 74 (1861).
143. See U.S. CoNsT. art I § 9 1 2; art. IV § 4; and art. H § 3. See CoRWIN,
supra note 33 at 143.
144. See McGonagle, supra note 78 at 226.
145. Id. at 225.
146. Id. at 226. See discussion accompanying notes 131-37 supra.
147. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Murphy, 478 F.2d 938 (1973).
148. See discussion accompanying note 116 supra.
149. See, e.g., Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) and Kore-
matsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). See also McGonagle su-
pra note 78 at 225,
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under the section 215, the risk of oppressive force is great. The
military has the ability to dominate society. The populace would
have neither the strength nor organization to overthrow the so-
phisticated and well-trained armed forces of the United States.'50
The troops themselves might have the ability to rebel, but the legal
and practical risk involved greatly inhibits the likelihood of such
a rebellion. The soldier would face disciplinary procedures for re-
fusing to obey a command or obstructing the execution of an or-
der.151 If, on the other hand, he executes an order of questionable
validity, he would be protected from civil and criminal liability in
most states by immunity statutes, and unless the order is manifestly
illegal, the soldier will not be liable.152 The soldier may be liable
150. The regular United States Armed Forces have historically always been
able to overcome recalcitrant forces. See Mutter, Some Observations
on Military Involvement in Domestic Disorders, 29 FED. B.J. 59, 60
(1959). The Confederate Army is the best example of a well organized
and well lead army that was unsuccessful. Even if the populace could
be organized as well as the Confederate Army, it would still have to
overcome the superior planning and sophisticated equipment that the
United States Army has developed since the Civil War.
151. The legality of military orders is almost an irrebutable presumption.
Both state (e.g. N.Y. Mn,. LAw § 130.88 (McKinney 1955)) and federal
(e.g. 10 U.S.C. §§ 890-892 (1970)) laws punish disobedient soldiers.
See United States v. Trano, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 293, 297, 3 C.VLR. 27, 31
(1952); United States v. Thorton, 34 C.M.R. 958 (Bd. of Rev. 1964);
United States v. Buttrick, 18 C.M.R. 622 (Bd. of Rev. 1954); United
States v. Gallagher, 15 C.M.R. 911 (Bd. of Rev. 1954); United States
v. Reese, 7 C.M.R. 292 (Bd. of Rev. 1953); United States v. Rosato, 5
C.M.R. 183 (Bd. of Rev. 1952); United States v. Whittaker, 5 C.M.R.
539 (Bd. of Rev. 1952). Accord, Ness, supra note 117 at 239-40.
The presumption has been held rebuttable. United States v. Bay-
hand, 6 U.S.C.M.A., 762, 21 C.M.R. 84 (1956); United States v. McCar-
thy, 23 C.M.R. 561 (Bd. of Rev. 1957); United States v. Roadcloud, 6
C.M.R. 384 (Bd. of Rev. 1952). Accord, Comment, supra note 117 at
240.
152. Commonwealth ex rel. Wadsworth v. Shortall, 206 Pa. 165, 55 A. 952
(1903); cf. Bean v. Beckwith, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 510 (1873); Brown
v. Cain, 56 F. Supp. 56 (E.D. Pa. 1944). Accord, Comment, supra note
117 at 236-37. Some state courts have held military immunity statutes
to be unconstitutional and invalid as a denial of state due process if
the statute's protection exceeds the civil immunity of regular law en-
forcement officers. O'Shee v. Stafford, 122 La. 444, 47 So. 764 (1908);
Bishop v. Wandercook, 298 Mich. 299, 200 N.W. 278 (1924). Accord,
Comment, supra note 117 at 236-37. But soldiers are rarely prose-
cuted. Id. at 240. An example of rare prosecution of soldiers is the
Kent State case where the evidence preserved in pictures and eyewit-
ness depositions strongly suggested a criminal conspiracy to commit
murder. See DAvEs REPORT, supra notes 1-8. Even though Attorney
General John Mitchell agreed with the President's Commission that
the rifle fire was "unnecessary, unwarranted and inexcusable," in a
statement released by the Justice Department on August 13, 1972, RE-
PORT OF THE PaSIDEN S COMMISSION ON CAMvPus UNREST 289 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as CAMPUS UNEST], a federal grand jury was not
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for violating the Civil Rights Act by depriving an individual of his
civil rights under the color of law, but only if the deprivation was
unnecessary to suppressing the insurrection.' 53 Finally, the soldier
usually lacks a clear, complete, factual picture of the chaotic situa-
tion to determine for himself the necessity of the order.5 4  When
the soldier weighs all these elements he would most likely follow the
order, avoiding disciplinary action and taking advantage of state
immunity statutes.
C. Judicial Construction
The judicial branch of the federal government has been ineffec-
tive in deterring the delegation of military power to the executive
and executive expansion of that power. As the forum for redress
of infringed rights of individuals, the courts have only recently
opened to judicial review the infringement of individual rights re-
sulting from an executive determination to use military troops in a
domestic civil setting. Actual standards defining and limiting ex-
ecutive power have not yet emerged.
The judiciary has concerned itself with two general issues in its
review of those cases involving this situation. The first is whether
the executive's determination that an emergency necessitating the
use of troops exists is conclusive and thus beyond judicial review;
the second is whether the court will review the use to which such
troops are put by the executive. The result is that the executive
determines what constitutes an exigency necessitating military
force and the manner in which military force will be used. The
courts will not interfere with executive use of military power until
after individual rights have been infringed and, even then, inter-
ference is rare. The major issue to be resolved is the scope of ex-
ecutive power and of executive immunity upon breaching limita-
tions on that power.
convened until February 15, 1974 and indictments against eight guards-
men for violations of the Civil Rights Act were not returned until
March 29, 1974, almost four years after the initial slayings. The
charges were subsequently dismissed on November 8, 1974. N.Y.
Times, Nov. 9, 1974, page 1, col. 3.
153. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) and discussion accom-
panying note 171 infra.
154. See Comment, supra note 117 at 240. The courts usually discuss "ex-
ecutive" power in general whether referring to a state executive or
the federal executive. The federal executive has been confronted in
court far less frequently than state executives, but in the two major
instances of Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 128-29 (1866) and
Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 314 n.10 (1944), the Court relied
on precedents relating to the exercise of similar power by state execu-
tives,
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1. The Power to Declare Exigencies
An analysis of the judiciary's role in the domestic uses of mili-
tary power must begin by distinguishing the executive power to
declare an exigency from executive use of military troops. In at-
tempting to separate the declaration of an exigency from the actual
use of troops in these situations, it is necessary to discuss their re-
spective derivations. Then a standard to be used iby the executive
in determining when an exigency necessitates a proclamation de-
ploying military troops must be formulated.
Scheuer v. Rhodes'55 is the most recent United States Supreme
Court case in the area of domestic military power. The Court ap-
pears to have opened to judicial review the executive's discretion
to declare an exigency necessitating military intervention. Sche-
uer becomes relevant only upon understanding the prior conflicting
precedents of the Supreme Court and the courts of appeals. Mor-
gan v. Rhodes 56 was the first case to arise out of the Kent State
University homicides. The plaintiffs in Morgan sought injunctive
and declaratory relief against the Governor of Ohio and officers of
the Ohio National Guard to prevent domestic use of troops on the
basis that they were so inadequately trained that they would jeop-
ardize life, limb, and constitutional rights. The plaintiffs sepa-
rated the right of the executive to proclaim an exigency from the
right of the executive to use the troops once the proclamation has
been made. By combining this with an action for injunctive relief
the plaintiffs presented the court squarely with (1) these two is-
sues, often undistinguished, which were first articulated in Sterling
v. Constantin,157 and (2) the issue of preventing a future proclama-
tion which would lead to violations of constitutional rights. The
Court held the executive's determination to declare a state of emer-
gency and call out troops was conclusive and not reviewable. The
injunctive relief from future premature deployment of military
forces was dismissed as an inappropriate substitute for executive
discretion. The Court affirmed a long line of precedent in dismiss-
ing the first cause of action by stating:
Executive decisions to call out military force have been litigated
a number of times in the history of the Republic.... But we find
no instance where the courts have sought to substitute judicialjudgment for constitutionally empowered judgment of the execu-
tive. Still less have the courts cumbered that executive judgment
with the prior restraint of an injunction seeking to describe in
advance the precise conditions which would make its exercise
appropriate.158
155. 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
156. 456 F.2d 608 (6th Cir. 1972).
157. 287 U.S. 378 (1932).
158. 456 ',2d 608, 610 (6th Cir. 1972). Precedent cited consisted of Duncan
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The Morgan Court relied heavily upon Sterling v. Constantin'59
which held an executive determination to declare an exigency ne-
cessitating the use of troops to be conclusive. According to the
Sterling Court, such power is necessary to the executive's ability to
exercise proper control in instances of sudden emergencies on grave
occasions to the union's existence. The power has a permitted
range of honest judgment for flexible measures to suppress vio-
lence and to restore order.1 60
The permitted range of judgment was the standard established
in Moyer v. Peabody.161 Under the Moyer Doctrine, the executive
has the authority to declare martial law, to detain citizens, and, if
necessary, the right to kill or seize bodies to prevent hostilities, but
not necessarily the authority to punish. The Moyer Court stated,
"When it comes to a decision by the head of the State upon a mat-
ter involving its life, the ordinary rights of individuals must yield
to what he deems the necessities of the moment. Public danger
warrants the substitution of executive process for judicial proc-
ess."162 The Sterling opinion quoted this language to support
their holding that the executive's determination of an exigency is
conclusive, where Moyer intended all domestic military action by
the executive to be conclusive without distinctions within that
power. The Sterling Court's further holding that the executive
could not order troops to perform acts which unnecessarily violate
constitutional rights,163 conflicted with Moyer. Where Moyer held
that executive discretion regarding domestic military power was
absolute in all respects, Sterling had two distinct holdings which
separated the discretion regarding use of troops (held to be re-
viewable) from the absolute discretion to declare an emergency.6 4
v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946); Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S.
378 (1932); Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78 (1909); Ex parte Milligan,
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.)
1 (1848); and Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19 (1827).
159. 287 U.S. 378 (1932). The case involved an injunction obtained by
owners of Texas oil wells against an order of the Texas Governor to
limit oil production. The Governor ignored the injunction and de-
clared a state of martial law, though there was no armed insurrection
or chaos by the oil well owners. He called the state militia to enforce
his first order. The property owners sought a second injunction and
appealed to the Supreme Court on the issue of whether such an injunc-
tion was within the scope of the judiciary's authority.
160. Id. at 399-400.
161. 212 U.S. 78 (1909).
162. Id. at 85.
163. The Texas Governor's orders were held to constitute an unlawful tak-
ing of private property by the state without due process of law. 287
U.S. 378, 403-04 (1932).
164. Commentators and decisions often fail to distinguish the holding re-
garding use of troops (which is reviewable) from the holding regard-
ing the declaration of an emergency (which i, not reviewable). See
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Subsequent lower court cases attempted to expand what was in-
cluded within the term "unlawful and unnecessary use of
troops."'61 5 Thus Sterling, in theory, concurred in part and reversed
in part the Moyer decision. 166 The Morgan court adopted the Ster-
ling adaptation of the Moyer Doctrine and held the executive's
decision to declare an exigency to be conclusive.
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the portion
of the Morgan decision refusing to review the executive's procla-
mation was upheld in Gilligan v. Morgan.107 The plaintiffs in
Gilligan argued that the troops, because of their training, were
inherently dangerous in an emergency setting and that by declar-
ing an emergency, they were automatically placed in such a situa-
tion with little chance for further instruction. Thus, the declara-
tion would be dangerous to the constitutional rights of citizens
and should be enjoined until the training procedures were
changed.
Gilligan presented the Court with the opportunity of fusing the
separate issues of executive proclamation and executive military
action under the proclamation into a single issue-the threat to
constitutional rights posed by the mere declaration of an emer-
gency. The Court failed to grasp that the issue involved was the
specific training techniques which link the governor's proclama-
tion to violations of constitutional rights. By holding the training
techniques to be unconstitutional, the Court could have provided
guidelines to the executive and legislature. Plaintiffs argued that
because the training techniques resulted in unconstitutional tactics
which had caused injuries or death, and because a proclamation ini-
tiated such unconstitutional tactics, the executive should be en-
joined from making a proclamation until training techniques were
corrected. The Court, however, saw the issue as being an open
and constant review on all legislative actions relevant to National
Guard training procedures. The Court, reversing the court of ap-
peals decision in Morgan to remand on the training procedures is-
sue, dismissed this issue as a political question, but upheld the lower
court's dismissal of the executive proclamation issue. The effect
of Gilligan v. Morgan is to allow executive decisions regarding the
Engdabl, Comprehensive Study, 43 U. COLo. L. REv. 399, 414 n.79(1972); see also Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 321 n.18 (1946);
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974); Krause v. Rhodes, 471 F.2d
430 (6th Cir. 1972); Valdes v. Black, 446 F.2d 1071 (10th Cir. 1971);
United States v. Chalk, 441 F.2d 1277 (4th Cir. 1971).
165. See Wilson & Co. v. Freeman, 179 F. Supp. 520 (D. Minn. 1959); Strut-
wear Knitting Co. v. Olson, 13 F. Supp. 384 (D. Minn. 1936); State v.
McPhail, 182 Miss. 360, 180 So. 387 (1938).
166. But see Engdahl, Comprehensive Study, supra note 164 at 414 n.78.
167. 413 U.S. 1 (1973).
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domestic use of troops to remain unchecked by judicial review. 68
After Gilligan, the Fourth Circuit retreated to the "political
question" position When the issue of reviewing executive procla-
mations arose in Krause v. Rhodes.169 The court affirmed the dis-
missal of the case when the defendant, Governor Rhodes, pre-
sented his proclamation of an emergency in his answer. The court
held that the proclamation was conclusive and absolute authority
for any extraordinary actions necessary to meet the disorder. The
remedy, according to the court, was not judicial review, but rather
rested with the legislative and executive branches of government.
The court also held the Governor was immune under the eleventh
amendment from prosecution for actions taken within the capacity
of his office. 1"'
The two Sterling holdings were finally merged when the Krause
decision was appealed to the Supreme Court. The Court, in Sche-
uer v. Rhodes,171 unanimously held both the executive proclama-
tion and use of troops were subject to judicial review. The actions
of state officials acting within the capacity of their office are sub-
ject to federal law when they deprive individuals of their consti-
tutional rights under the color of law. 72 The Court adopted a
standard of "qualified executive immunity." This means that al-
though the chief executive is limited in eleventh amendment im-
munity, he may exercise discretion within the scope of responsi-
bilities of his office in responding to the circumstances as they
reasonably appear to him at the time. 78 As the state official's
position in the government rises, his discretion widens, and he may
react to a crisis with unimpeded affirmative action. In times of civil
disorder the populace is skeptical, the facts are confused and cha-
otic, and use of force usually necessitates suspending civil liberties.
The chief executive must have very broad discretionary power but
it should not be unchecked. 74
The Court provided the means for checking executive power
when it quoted the passage from Sterling which limited the exec-
utive use of troops by allowing judicial review whenever there
168. The estates of the other students attempted to sue the State of Ohio
in the state courts. The cases were dismissed in the trial court, and
the appellate court reversed and remanded. The cause was certified
by the Ohio Supreme Court which reversed the judgment of the court
of appeals because the state had not consented to the suit. Krause
v. Ohio, 31 Ohio 2d 131, 285 N.E.2d 736 (1972); see also Krause v.
Rhodes, 471 F.2d 430 (6th Cir. 1972).
169. 471 F.2d 430 (6th Cir. 1972).
170. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
171. 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
172. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1971).
173. 416 U.S. at 247-48 (1974).
174. Id.
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was a substantial showing of an individual's righs being vio-
lated.
"When there is a substantial showing that the exertion of the
state has overridden private rights securred by that Constitution,
the subject is necessarily one for judicial inquiry in an appropriate
proceeding directed against the individual's charged with the trans-
gression." Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378 397-398 (1932)j75
The district court's dismissal was inappropriate because there was
no factual record. The Court held that a dismissal based only on
proof of the executive proclamation was premature and that there
could be no presumption of executive good faith nor could the
court take judicial notice of "mob rule" at Kent State University
without -allowing the plaintiffs to -prove the contrary. Thus, the
Scheuer Court held an executive proclamation to be less than
conclusive but having "great weight" with citation to Moyer. The
Court remanded the case for trial on the merits with instructions
to allow the allegations in the plaintiffs' pleadings to be raised,
proved and reviewed, including the proclamation and the use of
troops following it. The Court said:
The documents properly before the District Court at this early
pleading stage specifically placed in issue . . .whether [the Gov-
ernor and his subordinate officers] acted in good faith both in
proclaiming an emergency and as to the actions taken to cope
with the emergency so declared .... The complaining parties are
entitled to be heard more fully than is possible on a motion to dis-
miss a complaint .... We hold only that, on the allegations of
their respective complaints, they were entitled to have themjudicially resolved.17
Scheuer v. Rhodes answered in the affirmative the question of
whether the executive declaration of an exigency is subject to
judicial review. The Court failed, however, to respond to the
problem of excessive military power accumulated in the hands of
the executive. It should have taken a more active role in control-
ling the military through judicial review, thus providing a check
on executive power. The dichotomy between Gilligan and Scheuer
points to the Supreme Court's unwillingness to adopt pre-viola-
tion measures to protect constitutional rights. The law now reme-
dies violations only after they occur.
Scheuer also failed to enunciate guidelines for determining the
parameters of constitutionally permissible executive declarations.
The Milligan Doctrine, though substantially eroded by time and la-
ter decisions,1 77 supplements the current law as set forth in Sche-
uer v. Rhodes by providing guidelines for making executive proc-
175. Id. at 249 (emphasis added).
176. Id. at 250 (emphasis added).
177. See, e.g., discussion of Duncan v. Kahanamoku, notes 184-91 infra.
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lamations.1' 8
The United States Supreme Court in Ex parte Milligan1'7 9 held
that martial law cannot be established unless there is a valid
threat of invasion or insurrection. Martial law can never exist
while civilian courts are open and in proper and unrestricted exer-
cise of their jurisdiction. °8 0 The Court subjected the executive's
determination to declare martial law, as well as the subsequent
use of troops, to judicial review and attempted to establish stand-
ards for determining when an exigency exists. The Milligan Doc-
trine was later eroded by Moyer v. Peabody,'81 Sterling v. Constan-
tin'8 2 and other lower court decisions which held the executive de-
termination to use troops absolute and beyond judicial review.18
The Milligan standards have also been weakened by later holdings
that the mere threat of insurrection or disorder is sufficient to war-
rant deployment of federal troops.'8 4
Duncan v. Kahanamoku'8 5 is the only other Supreme Court
case where the declaration of martial law, though initially valid,
was reviewed to determine whether the exigency necessitating mar-
tial law still existed. In that case, the Governor of the territory of
Hawaii declared martial law, with presidential authorization, on
the day after the attack on Pearl Harbor. The Governor stepped
down from his position and was replaced by a military comman-
der, civil courts were closed and all persons were tried before a
178. Ex parte Mlligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866), illustrates the strictest
judicial scrutiny to which a decision of a President of the United States
has ever been subjected regarding domestic use of military troops
when the court challenged President Lincoln as principal and a subor-
dinate officer as agent on whether an actual emergency necessitating
martial law existed.
179. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 126-27 (1866). Even though the State of Indiana
had been threatened by invasion of the Confederate Army, early in
the Civil War, the Court held that Milligan's conviction for unlawfully
assembling, conspiring, aiding and abetting the enemy was invalid be-
cause he was tried before a military tribunal while civil courts were
still open. Compare Alabama v. United States, 373 U.S. 545 (1963),
where the Court stated that troops could be deployed in advance of
any civil disturbance if a mere threat of insurrection existed.
180. Id. at 127.
181. Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78 (1909).
182. Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378 (1932).
183. See Morgan v. Rhodes, 456 F.2d 608 (6th Cir. 1972); Bright v. Nunn,
448 F.2d 245 (6th Cir. 1971); United States v. Chalk, 441 F.2d 1277 (4th
Cir. 1971); Valdes v. Black, 446 F.2d 1071 (10th Cir. 1971); Ex parte
McDonald, 49 Mont. 454, 143 P. 947 (1914); Commonwealth ex rel.
Wadsworth v. Shortall, 206 Pa. 165, 55 A. 952 (1903); Hatfield v.
Graham, 73 W. Va. 759, 81 S.E. 533 (1914); State ex rel. Mays v.
Brown, 71 W. Va. 519, 77 S.E. 243 (1912).
184. Alabama v. United States, 373 U.S. 545 (1963).
185. 327 U.S. 304 (1946).
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military tribunal without the benefit of many due process rights.1 8 6
The Court held martial law could be declared under the statutes,
but replacing civilian courts with military tribunals for three years
was not justifiable, and this particular use of troops was invalid.
The Court cited language in Sterling limiting executive discre-
tion in declaring an emergency necessitating the use of troops, 8 7
even though this language, and the language and effect of Duncan,
spoke of limiting the use of military troops and the proclamation
in Duncan was authorized by Congress in advance.18 8 Thus, Dun-
can affected the use of troops though it appeared to be ruling on
the executive determination of an exigency. 89 The Court did state
that according to the Milligan Doctrine, the proclamation ceases to
be effective when the actual threat of hostilities passes. 90 Duncan
did not clarify or amend guidelines concerning the appropriateness
of a 'proclamation. The decision looks only to the limits on mili-
tary discretion after a proclamation has been made in face of a le-
gitimate threat, such as the bombing of Pearl Harbor, and it only
affects the use of troops.
Other than the misapplication of the Milligan Doctrine in Dun-
can, the Doctrine has no contemporary affect; especially since
Sterling held the executive's determination of an exigency to be
conclusive. Several courts have held that a governor has sole dis-
cretion to activate troops even though the threat to local govern-
ment no longer exists. 91 Court decisions indicate that an execu-
186. This continued long after the threat of Hawaii becoming a theatre for
World War H had been removed. Duncan and White were two civil-
ians who were arrested on criminal charges and convicted before a
military tribunal. They sought a Writ of Habeas Corpus from the Su-
preme Court.
187. Id. at 321 n.18.
189. See discussion accompanying note 164 supra.
188. Id. at 307-08. The Hawaiian Organic Act, ch. 339, § 67, 31 Stat. 141
(April 30, 1900) authorized the Territorial Governor to call out troops
if necessary to repel invasion, suppress insurrection or protect public
safety, and to suspend the Writ of Habeas Corpus and maintain "mar-
tial law."
190. 327 U.S. 304, 325-26 (1946).
191. Alabama v. United States, 373 U.S. 545 (1963). In Valdes v. Black,
446 F.2d 1071 (10th Cir. 1971), the court held that the declaration of
New Mexico's Governor was not subject to judicial review. The Gov-
ernor declared martial law and called the National Guard to arrest
thirty Spanish-American men, women, and children at a privately
owned ranch after they had surrendered the county courthouse which
they had previously been occupying. The holding in Valdes authorizes
use of troops not to detain dissenters or to restore order, but rather
to punish dissenters for disturbing the peace after order is restored.
The court instructed the jury:
[T]he commander of the Guard may use the measure of seiz-
ing the bodies of those whom he considers to stand in the way
of restoring peace. Such arrests are not necessarily for pun-
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tive can declare an exigency with little or no court interference un-
til after the damage is done.192 Scheuer states only that the court
will review the proclamation after it is made. Not only are there
no standards to determine the appropriateness of a proclamation,
but courts have refused to review the executive's determination of
an exigency's existence and thus have failed to establish even the
vaguest standards.
2. The Power to Use Troops
The second major issue is the executive's use of military troops
once an exigency is determined to exist. Courts have limited the
use, in theory, to lawful, constitutional orders designed to restore
order where there is an actual disorder. Although that limit has
been trumpeted frequently after the damage to individual rights
has occurred, it has never prevented the infliction of injury. The
holdings in Gilligan and Scheuer have had two effects: first, they
have temporarily postponed judicial review of pre-damage restraint
of executive use of troops, and second, they have upheld post-dam-
age judicial review. These decisions have not, however, made
such a suit a realistic remedy for the injured citizen.
Gilligan and Scheuer have virtually eliminated the possibility of
restraining executive use of troops before damage, injury or death
occurs. The Sterling Doctrine permitted judicial review of the ex-
ecutive's use of troops after his conclusive determination that an
emergency existed.193 The Sterling court further held that a gov-
ernor could be enjoined from using troops if he was seeking to en-
force an illegal order or if the use of troops would unduly infringe
on the constitutional rights of citizens.19 4  Lower court decisions
following Sterling adhered to this limitation of executive author-
ity, i.e., military troops may not be used to enforce an illegal or-
der. 95 In Morgan v. Rhodes, 96 the issues were presented in such a
ishment, but are by way of precaution to prevent the exercise
of hostile power.
Id. at 1076. If order is restored before the arrival of troops so that
the troops merely arrest individuals, but ignore the constitutional
standards which would bind state patrolmen when making the same
type of arrest, then the National Guard is acting as a law enforcement
agency to assist in punishing individuals for violating laws. Id. at
1076-77.
192. See discussion accompanying note 193 infra.
193. Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 402-03 (1932).
194. Sterling specifically allowed the Governor of Texas to be enjoined in
his use of military troops for enforcing an order already enjoined by
a federal court as an unlawful confiscation of private property. The
executive order for martial law was held not to be a key issue in the
case because it was an absolute and conclusive right of the Governor.
195. See discussion accompanying note 82 supra.
196. 456 F.2d 608 (6th Cir. 1972). See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232(1974); accord, Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 398 (1932).
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way that the court of appeals had to determine whether executive
use of military troops is subject to judicial review. The effect of
Gilligan (Morgan v. Rhodes on appeal to the Supreme Court),
however, was to place executive access to military troops beyond
judicial review. Thus, if rights are to be protected by a pre-injury
injunction, the injunction can only be obtained by attacking the ex-
ecutive's discretion and not the competence of the National Guard.
Scheuer's language makes it nearly impossible to attack execu-
tive discretion as a means of obtaining a pre-injury injunction. The
power of judicial review over an executive's use of troops was es-
tablished in Scheuer, so that at least the violation of constitutional
rights was restored to the Sterling Doctrine's position of having a
remedy, but under the language of Scheuer and Gilligan, pre-viola-
tion protection could not be achieved. Scheuer held, quoting the
Sterling Court, that the requisite standard for judicial review is
when "state power has overridden private rights secured by that
Constitution. '197 The implication is that judicial review cannot be
obtained before private rights have actually been overridden, and
thus executive discretion to order abusive use of troops is beyond
judicial review until injury to persons or rights has occurred. This
language is immediately followed by a negative pregnant in which
the Court states that Gilligan did not place the conduct of the Na-
tional Guard beyond judicial review.1 9 8  Gilligan did, however,
place the competence of the National Guard beyond judicial review.
The Court did not answer the question of whether an order not
yet obeyed was reviewable. Instead, it limited itself to "conduct"
which must have occurred and which must necessarily have in-
fringed prihate rights to be reviewable. The logical conclusion
when Scheuer is read with Sterling and Gilligan is that injury to
private rights must have occurred before review will be available.
It appears doubtful that an individual could obtain ex parte a
temporary restraining order by showing threatened violation of
constitutional rights when troops are used. Gilligan placed beyond
judicial review the issue of troops being inherently incompetent and
dangerous. Scheuer logically concludes that to have standing, the
individual must be able to prove an injury. Scheuer also grants
an executive qualified immunity if he can show that 'he acted in
good faith and within the discretion of his office in responding to
circumstances as they appeared to him. The standard, according
to Scheuer, is the Moyer Doctrine that an executive's declaration
is entitled to great weight. This places a high burden of proof
on the plaintiff to show bad faith by the executive-especially since
it is his view of circumstances which is relevant and only he has
197. 416 U.S. 232, 249-50.
198. Id., quoting Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378 (1932).
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access to the facts.199 Thus, the petition would likely be dismissed
for failure to maintain averments with evidence and/or because the
plaintiff's cause of action is not ripe.
Although a decision in an action to enjoin the use of troops
before they are actually deployed is not reviewable, Scheuer did not
exclude judicial review after constitutional rights had been vio-
lated. Before Scheuer the courts of appeals were divided on the
issue of reviewing troop use, but most courts dismissed suits
against the executive, either for lack of jurisdiction or because of
governmental immunity.2 0 0
Scheuer allowed plaintiffs to bring a suit for damages against
the governor personally. The eleventh amendment does not ap-
ply in a suit against a state official sued in his own name for depri-
vation of constitutional rights under the color of law.20 1 Thus, the
governor also has only "qualified immunity." A cause of action
arises when there is a substantial showing 'of state power overrid-
ing private rights. In a civil disorder, it will usually be necessary
to override some private rights to restore order. The issue is the
determination of the point at which the infringement of rights be-
come so gross that it warrants recovery. Scheuer permits viola-
tion of private rights as long as it is reasonably necessary, in the
eyes of the executive, to suppress the disorder.2 12  A violation of
constitutional rights through use of troops is the only cause of ac-
tion for which judicial review is available. The violation must
be unnecessary to the restoration of order for it to provide the ba-
sis for a successful case. The test is subjective-the reasonable ap-
pearance of the circumstances as they appear to the executive at
the time-in order to avoid retrospective evaluation of the situa-
tion -by courts. 20 3 The effect of the test is to necessitate a showing
of executive bad faith. The plaintiff has the burden of proof to
overcome the "great weight of authority" behind the executive's
proclamation. 20 4 He must show that the executive's view of the
199. Id. at 250. The Court adopted this from Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S.
78, 85 (1909).
200. In Krause v. Rhodes, 471 F.2d 430 (6th Cir. 1972), and Valdes v. Black,
446 F.2d 1071 (10th Cir. 1971), the executive's use of troops was con-
sidered conclusively beyond judicial review. In Krause, the Sixth Cir-
cuit stated that the opinion in United States v. Chalk, 441 F.2d 1277
(4th Cir. 1971), went beyond the executive orders and reviewed the
executive's actions but denied recovery. The court also cited Bright
v. Nunn, 448 F.2d 245 (6th Cir. 1971) where the court reviewed the
executive's order for "bad faith" and dismissed the case on its facts.
See discussion accompanying notes 214-15 infra regarding the decision
of cases on facts in the absence of standards of law.
201. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 237-38 (1974).
202. Id. at 248-49.
203. See discussion accompanying note 199 supra.
204. Id.
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circumstances would not suggest that his orders were reasonably
necessary to restore order and were excessive and without good
faith.20 5
The individual must also determine the standard for identifying
overridden private rights within the context of a civil disorder sup-
pressed by military troops. Several courts of appeals decisions
within the last ten years have reached diverse and inconsistent re-
sults in determining what constitutes executive bad faith or un-
reasonable use of military troops. Some have held that the -nor-
mal standards for criminal due process do not apply to military
troops used in a law enforcement capacity. 20 6 Others have held
that due process standards are relaxed, but must be followed at
least to some degree.207 Some courts have allowed denial of the
first anendment rights of free speech and assembly to a large
group 'because of the unorganized, rock throwing dissent of a few
people.208 Some authors have gone so far as to suggest that a dif-
ferent set of constitutional rights should be substituted for those
normally in operation whenever -an executive declares an exig-
ency.20 9 In Chalk v. United States,2 10 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit stated that the court should deter-
mine whether a reasonable man operating under the facts known
to the executive would consider the restrictions to be necessary
for the preservation of order. The problem most courts face is that
in a time of civil disorder, the normal criminal procedures protect-
ing various due process rights are impossible to observe in the midst
of massive chaos and large numbers of dissenters.21 1  The Su-
preme Court has left unanswered the question of what constitutes
a violation of a private right in an exigency. The plaintiff can
never be certain whether the facts he is presenting will constitute
a sufficient cause of action to warrant recovery.
The individual citizen's burden of proof is further complicated
by executive privilege which usually operates to deny the plaintiff
acccess to available evidence.21 2  Once troops are deployed, the
plaintiff's evidence is usually in the hands of the military. Thus,
if the executive acts in bad faith, he will have principal control of
the area, people, and evidence involved and usually will be the only
informed source of facts surrounding the disorder. Most discov-
205. 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
206. Valdes v. Black, 446 F.2d 1071 (10th Cir. 1971).
207. Sullivan v. Murphy, 478 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
208. Bright v. Nunn, 448 F.2d 245 (6th Cir. 1971).
209. Developments in the Law-The National Security Interest and Civil
Liberties, 85 HAiv. L. Rnv. 1130 (1972).
210. 441 F.2d 1277 (4th Cir. 1971).
211. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Murphy, 478 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
212. See discussion accompanying notes 133-35 supra.
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ery procedures will not yet be available because the plaintiff may
not have enough information to file a complaint stating a cause of
action. Even if discovery procedures were available, the evidence
might be classified-often on the grounds that it might incite fur-
ther disorder, tip-off criminal defendants concerning the govern-
ment's case or "threaten national security." The plaintiff is thus
faced with the task of forcing an executive acting in bad faith
to reveal evidence damaging to himself so that the executive may
be sued at a time when the plaintiff is uncertain of the evidential
substance. 213
If the plaintiff should obtain a judgment for damages or injunc-
tive and declaratory relief against the executive, the problem of ob-
taining execution remains. The issue has never been crucial be-
cause executives have been relenting in all cases, though in some
a minor confrontation occurred first.214  It is a struggle of the
court's justice versus the executive's military might, and to date
presidents have realized more would be gained by relenting than
by forcing a confrontation.
The fact remains that the chief executive can use any measures
he deems necessary to suppress civil disorders.215 If the result is
a derogation of fundamental rights, the issue is whether the facts
support a finding that executive action was necessary. Courts will
intervene, but only to review the facts in order to establish the
reasonableness of the actions taken in a particular case. They
do not decide cases on the basis of principles. Thus, the appearance
of a judicial review as a limit on executive military power may
become a facade.216 A commander can do almost anything in chaos
213. In Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (No. 9487) (C.C.D. Md. 1862),
Chief Justice Taney issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus and Coram Nobis
to the commanding general of the union army prison camp to produce
Merryman before the court. When the marshall appeared at the gate
of the camp, he was refused entrance and the general refused to com-
ply with the Writ on the grounds that President Lincoln had sus-
pended the Writ of Habeas Corpus. Taney allowed litigation on this
issue without attempting to enforce the Writ with a posse because he
recognized the futility of a marshall posse against an army. The Pres-
ident refused to release Merryman immediately, contending the Presi-
dent had the power to suspend the Writ of Habeas Corpus. Merry-
man was later released and turned over to civil authorities. See Maj.
Robert M. McDonough, Furnishing Federal Military Aid to Civil Au-
thorities (Thesis, Judge Advocate General's School, May 1956); CusH-
MAN & CUSHMAN, CASES IN CONSTiTUTIONAL LAw 151 (3rd Ed. 1968).
214. Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378 (1932), also involved a court order.
The Supreme Court ordered the governor to observe a lawful injunC-
tion and the governor yielded. Both these cases, however, illustrate
that an executive is limited only by a desire to preserve his own in-
tegrity and that of the court.
215. McGonagle, supra note 78 at 232.
216. Mutter supra note 150 at 62.
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and later establish justifying facts.
Judicial review of both executive proclamations of emergencies
and executive use of troops domestically has been vague and incon-
sistent in limiting executive discretion. The courts have not lim-
ited the chief executive because they have failed to provide con-
sistent guidelines for executive action and have shielded the execu-
tive and the military from the public. The courts cannot limit the
President as effectively as Congress, but they can establish direc-
tives to prevent wholesale infringement of personal freedoms in
the name of national security. Most significantly, the courts have
not provided a means of preventing infringement upon personal
freedoms before they occur; they cannot guarantee the preserva-
tion of civil liberties, ,but instead, offer only a post-injury remedy
-if the courts survive the imposition of martial law.
III. THE CONSEQUENCES
The executive has virtually unlimited discretion in his power to
use military troops domestically. Weak, vague and incomplete
statutes have effectively removed most congressional participation
in those decisions. The executive branch has subtly expanded
power delegated by Congress and established detailed programs
for domestic military deployment. The judiciary remains ineffec-
tive either in establishing clear legal limits for using military
power in civil disorders or in guaranteeing civil liberties in the
event that martial law was declared. The irony of this present
state of the law is that new proposals attempt to remove even the
facade of limitations rather than providing more substance.217
The accumulation of such power in the hands of one official
could result in substantial harm to our constitutional democracy.
Before effective limits can be developed, the advantages and disad-
vantages of concentrating this power must 'be weighed. The prob-
lem if left unsolved becomes less theoretical and more real as soci-
ety becomes more complex-the foundations for an American dic-
tatorship are lying dormant behind the personal integrity of whom-
ever is President. Once deployed, a military structure, unless self-
restrained, would overwhelm the populace.
217. The National Guard Association met in Puerto Rico on September 23,
1974, and proposed new legislation authorizing the President or the
Secretary of Defense to mobilize guard-reserve units totaling up to
50,000 men at any one time for a maximum of 90 days without a for-
mal proclamation of emergency. The aim is to use volunteers for
smaller emergencies whenever and wherever possible. Present plans
contemplate making National Guard end reserve units integral parts
of regular Army divisions for the first time. Lincoln Journal, Sept.
24, 1974.
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A. Theories of Power
The issue becomes how, and more fundamentally whether,
the laws should be changed to place effective limits on executive
power without destroying it. The interests of those advocating and
opposing limitations are considerations to be integrated into any
statutory reform scheme to provide a better balance of military
power in the three branches of the federal government.
The interests to be considered begin with an examination of
the soldier's role in the civil setting. The military's civil function
should deviate significantly in its ends and means from its princi-
pal mission in combat.218 The soldier is trained only for combat,
a role entirely different than the one played in civil disorders. 219
The mere presence of troops in the highly emotional setting of a
civil disorder often precipitates violence.2 2 0  Because of their
training, discipline and equipment, military -personnel are inher-
ently able to dominate the rest of society.221 The answer to limit-
ing executive action does not lie in a popular uprising because it
would have little, if any, chance of succeeding in a violent military
confrontation.
In previously discussed historical instances, 222 English kings
218. See Mutter, supra note 150. See also Lectures on Martial Law, DEP'T
oF ARMY PAwMPHLT, Jan., 1956.
219. National Guardsmen received thirty-three hours of training for civil
disorders in 1967 and this was later cut back to sixteen hours. See
CAMPUS UNREST, supra note 152, ch. 5 at 44. They are equipped for
combat. Id. at 45-51. These training standards are established by the
Department of Defense and the states can adopt them or lose federal
funding which constitutes approximately 90 per cent of most state Na-
tional Guard budgets. See Civm DisoRDERs, supra note 13 at 497-98.
The National Guard and Army lack the middle ground between a dis-
play of force greater than local law enforcement and the combative
force less than the lethal capability required to meet large foreign
powers. Id. at 502. The Army has developed seven special task forces
of brigade size, id. at 506-08, which were used to disperse riots. Id.
at 95. Their effectiveness then and now is not totally resolved. Im-
provements are needed to handle civil unrest, see CAMPUS UNREST, ch.
5 at 43-52; CivIL DisoRDERs at 508-10, and also CIVM DISASTERS. See
CIvmr DIsoRDERs at 522. In spite of these facts, the National Guard
was used 221 times in civil defense and never in foreign warfare
(Vietnam 'War) between 1967 and 1970. CAMPUS UNmrsT ch. 5 at 43.
From 1945 to 1968, the National Guard was used 100 times domesti-
cally, eighteen times in the summer of 1967. Civm DisoRDERs at 497.
220. The Kent State tragedy is an instance where military troops in a civil
disorder only increased tensions until the troops finally reacted as they
had been trained to do. See DAvIEs REPORT, supra note 1 at 26845. See
also CAMPus UNREST, supra note 152, ch. 4 at 56, and ch. 5 at 44-45,
50-51. Ciompare, R. FOGELsoN, VIoiENcE AS PROTEST: A STUDY Or RIOTS
AND GnmTTos 53 (1971).
221. See discussion accompanying note 150 supra.
222, See di~1~siQn accompanying note 14 supra,
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used force to subdue the population and to ensure their arbitrary
and absolute sovereignty. Parliament gradually displaced the ar-
bitrariness with the "Rule of Law" which the American system
inherited and established in the Constitution. 223 The Rule of Law
concept recognizes that a consistent standard of law must exist,
both with respect to substance and procedure, which guarantees
the fundamental rights of the citizens. It embraces social princi-
ples, rather than an individual or power, as the foundation of gov-
ernment. An individual's power can be limited by subordinating
it to the 'higher authority of principles and providing for the re-
moval of individual power, if it is abused.
For a society to survive and grow, its citizens must devise new
insights by reflecting upon their past experiences. This process
demands the interaction and communication of individual values
which generate common social values and a Rule of Law. The Con-
stitution has preserved this reflective process. Expression is pro-
tected from government encroachment in the first amendment;
equal protection demands that laws pursue values and policies
rather than individuals; and due process requires certainty in the
legal process affecting individual lives. These constitutional pro-
tections are the present Rule of Law. The Constitution provides
no exception to these protections in the event of necessity or in
using troops.
The Constitution divides power among three branches of gov-
ernment and provides a system of checks and balances to prevent
a particular branch from becoming so powerful that it could destroy
democracy and individual freedom.224 Constitutional drafters real-
ized that more was needed to protect freedom than the personal
integrity of a successful politician.22 5 "This nation, as experience
has proved, cannot always remain at peace and has no right to ex-
pect that it will always have wise and human rulers, sincerely at-
tached to principles of the Constitution.122 6 The three branches
of government are limited to powers specified and granted to them
by the Constitution. 2 7 The Court in Ex parte Milligan explained
the role of the President:
Wicked men, ambitious of power, with hatred of liberty and
contempt of law, may fill the place once occupied by Washington
and Lincoln;228 and if this right is conceded, and the calamities of
223. See Mutter, supra note 150 at 60.
224. See Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 149-50 (No. 9,487) (C.C.D. Md.
1861), Franks v. Smith, 142 Ky. 232, 134 S.W. 484 (1911).
225. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 WalL) 2 (1866).
226. Id. at 125.
227. Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (No. 9,487) (C.C.D. Md. 1861).
228. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 125 (1866). These remarks
on presidential limitations were directed at President Lincoln, Thus,
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war again befall us, the dangers to human liberty are frightful
to contemplate .... They knew-the history of the world told
them . . . that unlimited power, wherever lodged at such a time,
was especially hazardous to freemen. For this, and other equally
weighty reasons, they secured the inheritance they had fought to
maintain, by incorporating in a written constitution the safeguards
which time had proved were essential to its preservation.229
The intent of the framers of the Constitution was to limit pres-
idential power by subordinating it to judicial authority. The per-
sonal integrity of an individual President is not a sufficient limita-
tion on his power.
The only power ... which the President possesses, where life,
liberty or property of a private citizen is concerned, is the power
and duty presented in the third section of the second article, which
requires "that he shall take care that the laws shall be faithfully
executed." He is not authorized to execute them through agents or
officers, civil or military, appointed by himself, but he is to take
care that they be faithfully carried into execution, as they are ex-
pounded and adjudged by the co-ordinate branch of the govern-
ment to which that duty is assigned by the Constitution. It is, thus,
made his duty to come to the aid of the judicial authority, if it
shall be resisted by a force too strong to be overcome without the
assistance of the executive arm; but in exercising this power, he
acts in subordination to judicial authority, assisting it to execute
its process and enforcing its judgments. 23 0
The only exception allowed in the face of necessity is the sus-
pension of a Writ of Habeas Corpus until civil courts are reopened.231
The practical meaning of this exception is that individuals can be
detained until the exigency is over. To arrest and prosecute in-
dividuals, all due process rights are to be retained and followed in
civil courts if they are open.232 Although Milligan was initially ar-
rested for assembling with pro-Confederates, the Milligan Court
did not discuss the possibility of restricting free speech.233 The use
of military troops to restrict first amendment rights of speech and
assembly has the effect of furthering political values rather than
protecting people and property.
The concept of a Rule of Law should allow a President only
enough discretion to restore order without infringing on civil liber-
ties. The argument for allowing an exception to the superiority of
the Rule of Law is the "Principle of Necessity" which would jus-
even this "wise and humane ruler" needed to be restricted. See dis-
cussion accompanying note 178 supra. This decision was written about
twenty months after Lincoln's assassination.
229. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 125 (1866). These opinions
were written during the largest insurrection in the nation's history.
230. Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 149 (No. 9487) (C.C.D. Md. 1862).
231. Id. at 125-26.
232. See McGonagle, supra note 150 at 61.
233. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 6-7 (1866).
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tify placing all military power in the hands of the executive.2 4
Under this concept, the executive may take any action necessary
to safeguard the state from insurrection.235 The government is
viewed as having an indispensible right of self-preservation which
is jeopardized by insurrectionists. 236 The Constitution charges the
President with the duty of guaranteeing a republican form of gov-
ernment to all states,2 37 and gives him discretion in deciding what
is necessary to enforce the laws of the United States. The discre-
tion is most effective if exercised by one man elected by the public
because in an emergency situation, he can act rapidly. To allow
free and uninhibited discretion, courts do not review presidential
decisions because then the discretion would ultimately be with
the courts who would be viewing executive decisions retrospec-
tively.238 The government has an irrebuttable right to use military
force to protect itself because the purpose of the military is to sup-
port civil administration of liberty by ending disorders obstructing
the normal operations of the administration, whether the obstruction
was foreign or domestic. 239 Martial law is viewed as a substitution
for civil law when the constitutional guarantees are destroyed by
dissenters. 240 The President may substitute military control for
civil authority and a system of constitutional rights if he believes
this is necessary to restore order.241 The Moyer Doctrine held that
in balancing the rights of individuals against the right of the gov-
ernment to protect itself, the government had the right to survive,
and individuals' rights were secondary. Chief Justice Holmes stated
that the government has the right to kill or seize bodies if neces-
sary to prevent hostilities as long as it is done in good faith and
with the honest belief that the facts warranted this action.242 The
only limitation .on executive authority is that there must first be
an insurrection.243 The requisites necessary to determine whether
234. See Mutter, supra note 150 at 61.
235. WEnmR, THE LAw OF MARViAL LAW 16 (1930); accord, Mutter, supra
note 150 at 61.
236. State ex rel. Mays v. Brown, 71 W. Va. 519, 520-24, '77 S.E. 243, 244-
45 (1912); Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78, 85 (1909).
237. Compare, State ex rel. Mays v. Brown, 71 W. Va. 519, 77 S.E. 243(1912); Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78 (1909); see also U.S. CoNsT.
art. IV, § 4.
238. State ex rel. Mays v. Brown, 71 W. Va. 519, 524-25, 77 S.E. 243, 246
(1912); Hatfield v. Graham, 73 W. Va. 759, 765-69, 81 S.E. 533, 535-
36 (1914).
239. See Wknm supra note 235 at 15; accord, Mutter, supra note 150 at
61.
240. State ex rel. Mays v. Brown, 71 W. Va. 519, 524, 77 S.E. 243, 245 (1912);
Hatfield v. Graham, 73 W. Va. 759, 766-67, 81 S.E. 533, 536 (1914);
Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78, 85 (1909).
241. See Wmtum, supra note 235 at 60; accord, Mutter, supra note 150 at 61.
242. Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78, 84-86 (1909).24?. Id, At 05-00,
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an insurrection exists were never clarified because the executive's
decision was conclusive on that point. Thus the concept's applica-
tion resulted in eliminating effective limitations because there were
no procedures for enforcing those limitations.244
The executive's discretion should be limited without inhibiting
his effectiveness. This is possible if pre-arranged methods of oper-
ation incorporate a cognizance and observance of those limits. The
limits can only be enforced if the executive's discretion can be re-
viewed. The Sterling and Scheuer decisions reviewed the use of
troops and declaration of an emergency respectively. 24 5 The duty
to execute laws under the Constitution cannot be interpreted to
allow the executive to implement martial law, and thereby place
himself at the head of an autocracy supplanting the Constitution. 246
B. Recommendations
The Principle of Necessity need not concern itself with ensur-
ing individual rights even before a declaration of martial law is
made because the dedicated advocate of the theory does not be-
lieve the executive's discretion should be limited in any way re-
garding an emergency.2 47 Nevertheless, this persists as one of the
most substantial dangers in the present laws regarding the domes-
tic use of troops.
The Rule of Law Doctrine attempts to maintain a higher law to
which the government is always subordinated. The Principle of
Necessity Doctrine on the other hand, attempts to maintain govern-
ment by giving an executive enough discretion to deal freely and
244. In State ex rel. Mays v. Brown, 71 W. Va. 519, 77 S.E. 243 (1912),
the two defendants were arrested during the peaceful lull following
the suppression of an insurrection. Martial law was declared and was
upheld, along with the defendants' conviction without due process
rights even though there was no disorder at the time of arrest. In
Hatfield v. Graham, 73 W. Va. 759, 81 S.E. 533 (1914), the publisher
of the Socialist Printing Company sued Governor Hatfield of West Vir-
ginia for conspiring to destroy the publisher's printing office. Hatfield
sought a writ of prohibition against Judge Graham for entertaining
the suit. The Supreme Court of the United States upheld the decision
granting the writ even though the publishing office was in a county
outside the area of disorder and even though the publisher's only rela-
tion to the disorder was that he published materials favoring the posi-
tion of the dissenters.
245. See Mutter, supra note 150 at 61; discussions accompanying notes 159-
65, 195, and 171-76, 196-205 supra.
246. See McGonagle, supra note 78 at 232.
247. See Mutter, supra note 150 at 61; WENER supra note 235 at 16. There
are substantial issues involving the debate over whether civil disobedi-
ence is ever justified-an issue beyond the scope of this Comment.
See Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HAv.
L. REv. 593 (1958).
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effectively with any foreign or domestic threat. Any reforms
should incorporate concepts from these two doctrines by providing
an executive with discretion that is effectively limited by legislative
definitions, controlled by active legislative and judicial involve-
ment and restrained by pre- and post-injury statutory injunctions.
The current constraint consists primarily of presidential trust and
good faith. The general theme of all reform in this area must be
a redistribution of power relating to the use of military troops
so that the President is checked ,by the legislature and the courts
but retains the power to choose between several statutory al-
ternatives of limited scope, duration, and control.
The need for statutory definitions includes revising chapter fif-
teen of Title 10 of the United States Code to include definitions
of such terms as a civil disorder necessitating the use of the militia.
Guidelines must be established to determine when a threat to lo-
cal authorities and local law enforcement becomes so substantial
that troops are needed to control the situation.248  When troops are
deployed, statutory standards should be established regarding the
proper use of the troops. They should be directed constantly to
support and protect local, state, and national government opera-
tions when obstructed. An explicit statute should prohibit closing
a court or adjourning a local, state or national legislative body.2 49
Upon restoration of local government authority, even at a mini-
mal level, local authorities should be able to establish objectives
which can be carried out by the military with minimal disrup-
tion to people, property, and government.250
Local authorities should be kept constantly informed on develop-
ments. 251 The military should be subjected to the same constitu-
tional standards of law enforcement and should observe the same
local, state, and national laws as local authorities. This should in-
clude explicit provisions for protecting first amendment rights to
assemble, speak, print, and demonstrate 'peaceably (or even pro-
fanely and vociferously) as long as people, property and vital access
areas are protected. It is only when weapons are used, individuals
are assaulted, or property is trespassed on and converted beyond
the control of local law enforcement that troops should be de-
248. The reasoning and holding in Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2
(1866), provides a starting point for devising such a statutory defini-
tion.
249. The Constitution requires the Congress to meet once a year. U.S.
CoNsT. art. I, § 4, and to adjourn on agreement of both houses. Id.
§ 5. It allows the President to adjourn Congress only when the two
Houses cannot agree on adjournment. 'But even then he can only
adjourn Congress until a later time and not indefinitely. Id. § 3.
250. See CAiMPUS UNREsT, supra note 152, ch. 5 at 52-53.
251. Id. at 53.
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loyed-and then only to -protect -people and property and to dis-
arm the dissenters. 252 Arrests made during this period should pro-
vide full due process rights or they should not be made at all.
The only exception to requiring procedural due process for arrest
during this period is the temporary suspension of the Writ of Ha-
beas Corpus. This would allow persons to be detained for a period of
time without arrest or prosecution to allow the situation to stabi-
lize. Because the Writ remains but its exercise is postponed, statu-
tory guidelines must be established specifying a maximum period
of detention without prosecution. If charges are not brought, any
damages to the individual should be paid by the government upon
proof of loss.
The legislative and judicial involvement in the deployment of
troops can be achieved by adopting legislation which automatically
initiates legislative investigation of the causes of the disorder as
well as the need for using troops. The executive proclamation of
an emergency necessitating the use of troops would trigger the in-
vestigation but the executive would still have the discretion to
make the proclamation. The investigation could examine the ex-
ecutive's good faith and provide a coherent study of the causes of
the dissent which would alleviate one of the major causes of civil
disorders-the inability to reform conditions and the lack of a
forum to release tensions.253 This means that the motivations of
both the executive and the dissenters, as well as the circum-
stances of the disorder, would have to be investigated and the con-
gressional committee would necessarily to have access to all military
data obtained during the disorder.
An alternative would .be for Congress to impose the same limits
on domestic use of troops by the President as imposed on the for-
eign use of troops in the War Resolution. 254 Troops could be de-
ployed only after a proclamation to rioters to cease their actions
and retire peaceably.2 55 The proclamation would trigger a full re-
252. A lesser standard would allow the troops to disperse the crowd be-
cause of the subject of their dissent. This borders on authorized po-
litical oppression.
253. See CAMTPus UNREST, supra note 152; R. FOGELSON, VIOLENCE AS PRO-
TEST: A STUDY Or RIOTS Am Gxrrros 53 (1971). These incidents il-
lustrate that such an investigation can be very useful in preventing
violence and bad faith and abuse of executive power as well as in
drafting a course of action to remedy the cause of such disturbances.
254. In urban areas, the absence of property insurance to protect against
riot loss is more pronounced according to the Advisory Commission
on Civil Disorders. CVIL DISORDERS, supra note 13 at 360-62. Because
many factors other than riots make it difficult to provide such cover-
age, federal loans ought to be made available in specific instances
where private individuals are without private insurance.
255. This would necessitate amending 10 U.S.C. § 334 (1970) by removing
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port to Congress within 48 hours of the circumstances necessitating
the use of troops. Both the proclamation and the report would
require congressional ratification as soon as possible.
Because the populace could not effectively oppose a monolithic
military force under the control of a despotic executive, to pre-
serve the above described limitations, command ties 'between of-
ficers and their subordinates would have to be broken if an over-
reaching order were given. This means that the statutory limit
must be made explicitly clear so that those responsible for imple-
menting orders recognize a violation of the first amendment or due
process. Also procedures must be established to comply with those
limitations so that breach of the routine is the only instance where
a soldier needs to 'be suspicious. Finally, criminal sanctions must
be imposed for obeying an order which exceeds statutory limitsY 56
A soldier in a domestic setting who is uncertain about the legal-
ity of an order should have the right to refuse obedience until the
legality of the order is clarified in court. For any of these sug-
gested reforms to be effective, there must be a procedure for break-
ing up the command structure and making individuals responsible
for their own acts.
At the stage of a civil disorder where a soldier suspects the le-
gality of his order, the judicial process would be more appropriate
than legislative or administrative processes for issuing efficient or-
ders to restrict deployment of troops or to stop their improper
use.257 Statutory authority would provide the courts with express
power to grant a restraining order or injunction, thus removing
ambiguity in the minds of judges concerning the court's jurisdic-
tion. 25 8 This would also indicate to the executive that the Congress
politically and financially supports subjecting executive orders to
the words "under this chapter," thus making it applicable in all in-
stances where troops are deployed rather than only those instances
arising under chapter fifteen.
256. The present status of criminal liability regarding soldiers is that the
order must be illegal on its face in order to convict the soldier. Com-
monwealth ex rel. Wadsworth v. Shortall, 206 Pa. 165, 55 A. 952(1903); United States v. Whatley, 20 C.M.R. 614 (ACM 10448, 1955);
United States v. Kinder, 14 C.M.R. 742 (ACM 7321, 1954).
257. The military have acted on orders from the courts in both Shay's Re-
bellion of 1786 and the Whiskey Rebellion of 1794. A judge accompan-
ied the troops in the field to issue warrants during the Whiskey Rebel-
lion. Comment, supra note 117 at 216. See Note, Rule by Martial Law
in Indiana: The Scope of Executive Power, 31 IwD. L.J. 456. 468
(1956).
258. See, e.g., United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872); Ex
parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 WaIL) 506 (1869); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S.
(8 How.) 441 (1850). See also P. BATOn, P. MisnxIN, D. SaApmo, H.
WEcHsLER, HART AND WEcHSLER's Tim FEDERAL CouRTs AND THE FEDERAL
SYsTEm 309-418 (2d ed. 1973).
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the courts to decide if he acted within statutory limitations. The
statute should provide for enjoining the use of troops to infringe
on an individual's constitutional rights if it can be shown that the
risk of destruction is substantial or abusive. The injunction would
have to be applicable to deployment of troops as well. Its effect
would be to nullify the officer's orders and hold a soldier obeying
the order in criminal contempt and make him civilly liable for dam-
age or injury to individual citizens which occurred as a result of
his actions. An injunction would be one attempt at guaranteeing
the individual his rights before and during the time of the troop
deployment.
Finally, legislation should be enacted to compensate civilians
who have been injured or have had property damaged as a result of
military action. Since most liability insurers will not cover such
losses2 59 the government should adopt an approach whereby the
government can take whatever action it believes necessary to avert
the crisis, but must compensate those damaged.260 A scheme of
compensation and loans to riot victims, particularly when federal
military tactics contribute to the destruction, should be developed
with specific provisions being put forth in the congressional rati-
fication of presidential actions.
259. The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders noted the un-
availability of insurance in center city areas. A special panel was
called to investigate the problem and proposed a five-part program,
based on a cooperative effort between the insurance industry and fed-
eral and state governments, to assure the availability of property in-
surance. See CivIL DIsoRDERs, supra note 13 at 360-62.
260. See, e.g., Ploof v. Putnam, 81 Vt. 471, 71 A. 188 (1908), where the court
held that an individual in times of necessity may protect himself at
the expense of another's property and the landowner does not have
the privilege to resist or expel the intruder. In Vincent v. Lake Erie
Transportation, 109 Minn. 456, 124 N.W. 221 (1910), the court allowed
a landowner to later obtain compensation for damage resulting from
an intrusion. See W. PROssER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw oF TORTS, § 24
(4th ed. 1971). Some countries such as Great Britain have passed acts
of indemnity on occasion to provide the civilians with funds to cover
their losses and to eliminate large judgments after a civil disorder
against soldiers who cannot pay them. C. FAuvMAN, TH LAW OF MAR-
TL RuLE 207-09 (1930). This has not been the general practice in
the United States except for the Civil War. W. WINTHROP, MILTARY
LAW AND PRECEDENTS 830 (2d ed. 1920 reprint). Maintaining strict
criminal liability of soldiers for carrying out patently unlawful orders
and ultra vires acts would still operate as a deterrant. Compare 28
U.S.C. § 2680(h). See Bate$ v. Clark, 95 U.S. 204 (1877); cf. Milligan
v. Hovey, 17 Fed. Cas. 380 (No. 9,605) (C.C.D. Ind. 1871); McCall v.
McDowell, 15 Fed. Cas. 1235 (No. 8,673) (C.C.D. Cal. 1867); Fluke v.
Canton, 31 Okla. 718, 123 P. 1049 (1912). But see Bishop v. Vander-
cook, 228 Mich. 229, 200 N.W. 278 (1924); Franks v. Smith, 142 Ky.
232, 134 S.W. 484 (1911).
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These suggested alternatives are directed toward the preserva-
tion of both order and freedom. When necessary, force can be used,
if properly limited. It is fallacious to refuse to limit power before
the circumstances necessitating a decision arise. To allow a spon-
taneous decision unlimited in scope, and consequently indifferent
to social interests, may provide order but at a very substantial risk
to the primary objective of preserving laws regarding freedom. To
make the state's existence superior to the rights of the individuals
comprising society and to give those individuals functioning in the
name of government unlimited power is tyranny, because the con-
cept places human rights in the hands of a few. It fails to realize
the true foundation of human rights lies in the dignity of reason
inherently necessary to the evolution of man within his society and
a necessary result of man's reflective self. 2 61
C. The Danger
Presently power concerning the domestic use of troops lies with
the President. A description of the process of instituting martial
law on a nationwide basis for the purpose of removing political dis-
sent will illustrate the significance of this concentrated power.
Since the President's integrity and character are the only re-
straints on his discretion to use military power, this power might
be used for political purposes. 262 The mood of the President and
his staff and the interrelationship between the executive and the
staff play an important role in decisions concerning political dis-
sent and civil disorder. Much power can be delegated to the exec-
utive staff who can perpetrate an autocracy by controlling infor-
mation flowing to the executive and by exercising discretion in im-
plementing executive orders. 263 The executive may also manipu-
261. See CAVPUS UNmrST, supra note 152, ch. 2 at 1-63, especially 7-8 and
37-46.
262. See McGonagle, supra note 78 at 231; see discussion accompanying
note 111 supra.
263. Presidential adviser John Dean IH testified before a select committee
on presidential campaign activities that his attempts to restrain the
White House from interfering with tactical decisions regarding demon-
strations were sometimes superceded by John Ehrlichman and Robert
Haldeman, advisers to then President Nixon.
Sometimes they so instructed me to inform the Justice De-
partment or Chief Wilson of the Metropolitan Police and
sometimes Mr. Ehrlichman would so inform Justice or the
Chief himself....
I also received frequent complaints regarding the quality
of the available information, despite the fact that I felt the
White House had the best information available to the govern-
ment.
I b6came directly and personally aware of the President's
own interest in my reports regarding demonstrations when he
called me during a demonstration of the Vietnam Veterans
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late staff members by revealing partial details to avoid the staff
members' private moral inhibitions. Because of the power the
executive maintains over the staff, his analysis will usually pre-
vail,214 and in the case of a highly motivated President individual
rights could be suppressed.2 65
If the executive believed that resort to martial law was neces-
sary to preserve the nation, the proclamation deploying troops
would not be subject to legal or practical restraints. Most of the
constitutional power of Congress has been delegated to the Presi-
dent, and has been expanded through a process of executive in-
terpretation.266  The military high command, if they refused to
obey orders to assume control,267 could limit presidential power.
They would be in a position, however, of choosing between proba-
ble court martial for disobeying orders and the relative safety pro-
vided by immunity statutes, even if their conduct violated consti-
tutional rights, if it could be shown that the action taken was rea-
sonable from their viewpoint. 268
Because the soldier lacks the complete and accurate data of the
Against the War which occurred on the Mall in front of the
Capitol. This was the occasion in May, 1971 . . . when the
government first sought to enjoin the demonstration and later
backed down. The President called me for a first-hand report
during the demonstration and expressed his concern that I
keep him abreast of what was occurring. Accordingly, we
prepared hourly status reports and sent them to the President.
Hearings on the Watergate Investigation Before the Select Comm. on
Presidential Campaign Activities, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., Vol. III (June
25, 26, 1973) [hereinafter cited as Watergate Hearings].
264. John Dean testified:
I was made aware of the President's strong feelings about even
the smallest of demonstrations during late winter of 1971,
when the President's dissatisfaction with a lone dissenter in
view of his window resulted in the man who was going to be
"removed" by "thugs" being convinced to move out of view.
Dean testified further:
I learned a major part of any Presidential trip advance
operation was insuring that demonstrators were unseen and
unheard by the President ....
I learned that any means-legal or illegal-were authorized
by Mr. Haldeman to deal with demonstrators when the Presi-
dent was traveling or appearing someplace.
Id. at 917-18.
265. John Dean alleged that the President had personally assigned Tom
Huston to work on a security project involving the FBI and former
Director Hoover in electronic surveillance and penetrations, mail cov-
erage, surreptitious entry, monitoring campus activists, using military
undercover agents and coordination of domestic intelligence opera-
tions. Id. at 1060-65. Dean presented exhibits of the plan along with
related memoranda to the Committee. Id. at 1319, Exhibit 35.
266. See discussion accompanying notes 122-27 supra.
267. See discussion accompanying notes 255-57 supra.
268. See discussion accompanying note 151 supra.
EXECUTIVE POWER
Pentagon commanders,2 9 his limited knowledge may act as a cata-
lyst in aggravating the situation. As the level of dissent increases,
a solidified military response will appear more appropriate to sol-
diers and commanders. 270 If this action-reaction process continues,
what may have begun as a political dissent could approach the
level of an insurrection.2 71
If the President responded to the situation by deploying troops
(on the premise that such action was necessary to the nation's se-
curity), congressional interference would be a possibility. In the
first instance, a distorted picture of the situation could be pre-
sented to Congress by controlling the release of information. Con-
gressional suspicion could be met by deploying troops as law en-
forcement officers to deal with dissenters in the Capitol,272 and
Congress could be adjourned. Congress would be legally and
physically powerless to respond. Further, the news media could
be controlled through censorship to eliminate it as a forum for dis-
sent.273  Ultimately, dissenting congressional leaders could be
falsely associated with the disorder.27 4
269. See discussion accompanying notes 126-28, 132 supra.
270. See discussion accompanying note 139 supra. Cf. CAAvus UNREST,
supra note 152, ch. 3 at 53-56, ch. 4 at 5-9, ch. 5 at 3-4 and 45; Fo-
GELSON, supra note 253 at 78. See, e.g., DAVIES REPORT, supra note at
26843, col. 1.
271. See discussion accompanying note 219 supra.
272. See, e.g. Sullivan v. Murphy, 478 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1973) and discus-
sion accompanying note 263, supra.
273. See discussion accompanying note 219; see also Addendum A and note
285 infra.
274. John Dean testified:
I stated earlier that there was a continuing dissatisfaction with
the available intelligence reports. The most frequent critic
was Mr. Haldeman, but the President himself discussed this
with me in early March of this year, as a part of the planned
counteroffensive for dealing with the Senate Watergate in-
vestigation. The President wanted to show that his opponents
had employed demonstrators against him during his reelection
campaign. However, with each demonstration that the Presi-
dent was confronted with, and each incident that occurred
during the campaign, my office had sought to determine if it
had in fact been instigated by political opponents of the Presi-dent-Senator McGovern, the Democratic Party, or whomever.
We never found a scintilla of viable evidence indicating that
these demonstrators were part of a master plan; nor that they
were funded by the Democratic political funds; nor that they
had any direct connection with the McGovern campaign. This
was explained to Mr. Haldeman, but the President believed
that the opposite was, in fact, true. I have submitted to the
committee the text of the President's memorandum to me on
the subject.
Watergate Hearings, supra note 263 at 918. See also id. at 1100, Ex-
hibit 34-1 (Memo from President Nixon to John Dean stating that
more information linking McGovern to demonstrations must be ob-
tained).
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The courts would have the power to enjoin presidential action
only if a constitutional right had been unnecessarily infringed.
There is no precedent for pre-infringement review to obtain an in-
junction, and after Gilligan v. Morgan275 it appears that this ap-
proach is not likely to be altered in the near future. Ultimately,
the courts could be closed (without violating precedent or statute)
to eliminate any possibility of obtaining an injunction.2 7 6 Even if
the courts remained open, a President could prevail merely on a
showing that his view of the facts was reasonable.2 77
If martial law was declared on a national scale, two likely re-
sults would be the suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus and a
suppression of the first amendment rights of speech and associa-
tion.2 7 8 Suspension of Habeas Corpus would probably be necessary
to maintain order, and mere detention, without formal arrest, is
an extremely effective riot control device.279 Dissenters could be
detained indefinitely, possibly in existing concentration camps,
28 0
charged and summarily convicted either by a judge or court-mar-
tial.28
1
275. See discussion of Gilligan v. Morgan, supra at note 167.
276. See discussion of Duncan v. Kahanamoku, supra at notes 186-90.
277. See discussion of Scheuer v. Rhodes, supra at note 205.
278. Bright v. Nunn, 448 F.2d 245 (Cir. 1971), upheld the right of a governor
and campus president to prohibit demonstrations. The prohibition ap-
plied to the entire campus of Kentucky University, though only a part
of the campus and a few students were involved in a disorder.
279. See Developments in the Law-The National Security Interest and
Civil Liberties, 85 HAuv. L. REv. 1130 (1972); see also discussion ac-
companying note 142-49 supra.
280. See discussion accompanying note 139 supra. In Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), the Supreme Court held that persons sus-
pected of sabotage could be detained in concentration camps without
trial, due process, or actual evidence. In Ex parte Mitsuye, 323 U.S.
283 (1944), however, the Court said that once loyalty was determined,
those detained should be released. See McGonagle, supra note 78 at
225. Although the EDA was repealed in 1971, Act of Sept. 25, 1971
Pub. L. No. 92-128 § 2(2), 85 Stat. 348, the repeal did not eliminate
the actual facilities and some have alleged that they are still main-
tained by the federal government. See discussion accompanying note
139 supra. In his testimony at the Watergate Hearings John Dean al-
leged that Gordon Liddy had been involved in some activities concern-
ing the possible detention of dissenters. Dean stated that Liddy "ex-
plained that the mugging squads could, for example, rough up demon-
strators that were causing problems. The kidnapping teams could
remove demonstration leaders and take them below the Mexican bor-
der and thereby diminish the ability of the demonstrators to cause
problems at the San Diego convention. Watergate Hearings, supra
note 274 at 929.
281. See discussion accompanying notes 142-46 supra. See also Ex parte
Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866), Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 US.
EXECUTIVE POWER
If military operations are directed at political dissenters, in-
fringement of first amendment rights would surely follow. The
"clear and present danger" doctrine2 2 could be perverted to in-
clude whatever was deemed a clear and present danger from the
executive's viewpoint.28 3  In addition to controlling the only re-
liable sources of information, censorship by the military of material
which the executive views as dangerously sympathetic to dissi-
dents has historical precedent. 28 4 Further, restraints on associa-
tion and invasions of privacy through electronic surveillance, mail
coverage and surreptitious entry would be unrestrained during a
period of martial law.28 5
Some have gone beyond describing the threat of military dic-
tatorship in the United States in hypothetical terms. 28 6 Indeed,
304 (1946). These decisions would be applicable only after the deten-
tion had taken place and assuming that the Writ of Habeas Corpus was
available, and assuming further that the courts were open.
282. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Yates v. United States,
354 U.S. 298 (1957); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951);
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1918).
283. See discussion accompanying notes 123-26 supra.
284. In Hatfield v. Graham, 73 W. Va. 759, 81 S.E. 533 (1914), the West
Virginia Supreme Court upheld the destruction of an editor's printing
office in the county next to the county experiencing riots because the
contents of the editor's newspaper were felt to favor the dissenters.
285. See discussion accompanying note 265 supra.
286. In the August, 1970 edition of a short-lived periodical entitled Scan-
Ian's a memorandum appeared allegedly linking Vice President Ag-
new's office with plans to cancel the 1972 national election and repeal
the Bill of Rights. James M. Naughton, in a New York Times article,
reported the soon to be published Scaniam's memorandum. Naughton
reported:
According to the memorandum, the Rand Corporation, a Cal-
ifornia research company, agreed to a "judicious leak" of a
study on cancellation of the election but did not feel that any
information should be made public on a plan for repeal of the
Bill of Rights.
The document also contains paragraphs implying that the
Nixon Administration, using funds of the Central Intelligence
Agency, would inspire demonstrations in support of the Presi-
dent's Indochina policies by construction workers in New
York, Pittsburgh, Chicago, Saint Louis, and Seattle.
The memorandum on stationery with the heading "The
Vice President," is dated March 11. Rumors were heard in
April and spread quickly across the country that the Rand
Corporation was preparing a secret study on the implications
of cancellation of the 1972 election.
The White House and officials of the California company
have repeatedly denied that any such study was ever under-
taken or contemplated.
Mr. Agnew said ... the document ... was "completely
false."
Mr. Zion said that.., it had come to him from a source
who had never misled him in the past....
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during the days preceeding President Nixon's resignation, concern
for the constitutional process extended to the cabinet. Secretary
of Defense, James R. Schlesinger, and Secretary of State, Henry
Kissinger, had all orders closely monitored to determine their
source because of a concern that a White House order for the do-
mestic deployment of troops might be given directly to a military
unit.
There were two major areas of concern on Mr. Schlesinger's
mind, ....
The first was that in some "improbable" situation, Mr. Nixon
or one of his aides might get in touch with some military units
directly without going through the usual Pentagon chain of com-
mand and order that some action be taken to block the "Consti-
tutional process".
The second was that a genuine national emergency might
develop in which American military units might have to be placed
on alert or go into action, and Mr. Schlesinger and General Brown
wanted to be able publicly to justify the actions .... 287
Mr. Zion said: "The document came directly from Mr. Ag-
new's office, and he knows it. We do not hesitate to submit
our credibility against his."
N.Y. Times, July 22, 1970, at 23, col. 1. The article reported that Vice
President Agnew's substantiation for his denial was that the memoran-
dum was printed on the wrong stationery and the word "confidential"
was in the wrong corner. According to Agnew, the memorandum was
on stationery used by the previous administration. Mr. Zion's re-
sponse was "that it was possible Mr. Agnew's office had used the old
stationery in the interest of economy." Id.
A week later Scanlan's placed an ad in the New York Times chal-
lenging the Vice President to a test of credibility. N.Y. Times, July
30, 1970, at 34, col. 2. In the same issue, an article reported that Attor-
ney General John Mitchell had indicated that an investigation was be-
ing conducted to find the source of the rumor reported in Scanlan's.
Id. at 15, col. 1. In a personal telephone conversation with the author
on February 26, 1974, Mr. Zion claimed the investigation was never
completed because the study had been verified and that he believed
the government had driven him out of business. He also believed that
government pressure had been applied to Scanlan's printers and dis-
tributors in the United States and Canada. The credibility of this in-
formation is admittedly questionable, but this Comment is an attempt
to illustrate the significance of the problem and not to report the news.
287. N.Y. Times, Aug. 25, 1974, at 6, col. 2-3.
288. Id. at 32, col. 3-4. The concern at the time of President Nixon's res-
ignation was largely a reaction to a similar situation occurring ten
months earlier during the "Saturday Night Massacre" of October 20,
1973, when the President dismissed Watergate special prosecutor,
Archibald Cox, which precipitated the resignation of Attorney General
Elliot Richardson and the ouster of his deputy, William D. Ruckels-
haus. Id. Nixon ordered an emergency alert of all military forces on
October 24 and 25, 1973, when it seemed as if the Soviet Union was
contemplating sending forces into the Middle East. The public skepti-
EXECUTIVE POWER
There was not only concern that somebody at the White House
might order some unit to act against Congress but also that some
official might seek to have some unit oust the President.28 8
The present laws regarding executive use of military power
domestically are in an extremely dangerous state. It is the respon-
sibility of all persons in a position to amend this legal crisis, par-
ticularly legislators, to decide whether the situation can be ignored.
Although the law embraces the Principle of Necessity as the means
to preserve democracy, its inability to control the executive once
a decision to deploy troops has been made is a dormant beast which,
if awakened, would devastate the social values which made our na-
tion worth securing.
Michael T. Foster, '75
cism shown during the alert worried Mr. Kissinger and Mr. Schle-
singer. Mr. Schlesinger decided to remain in Washington during the
presidential resignation so that he would be at the center of the Penta-
gon command. He stated: "In keeping with my statutory responsibil-
itiea, I did assure myself that there would be no question about the
proper constitutional and legislated chain of command and there never
was any question." Id.
